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ABSTRACT 
The Danger of Being Neighbors:  
Community Information and Corporate Tax Avoidance 
by 
WANG Xiaowei 
Doctor of Philosophy 
This paper examines the relationship between tax officers’ access to community 
information and the effectiveness of tax authorities in constraining tax avoidance in 
China. Numerous studies document that people can obtain valuable information in the 
community in which their daily activities take place (community information). 
Focusing on a valuable setting in China in which corporate taxes are collected by tax 
offices that are located very close to firms (with an average distance of 6.5 km), this 
study examines whether tax officers’ access to community information at a firm’s 
location can reduce the firm’s tax avoidance. I broadly define tax avoidance as the 
reduction of income taxes per dollar of pre-tax accounting earnings. Using a sample 
of publicly listed firms between 2007 and 2017, I first use geographic distance between 
tax offices and firms to measure the likelihood of tax officers’ having access to 
community information at a firm’s location and examine its effects on the listed firms’ 
level of tax avoidance. I find that the level of tax avoidance is higher when tax offices 
and firms are located far away from each other. I also find that the distance effect is 
stronger when firms’ tax officers and managers are socially connected.  
Second, I use functional distance between tax offices and firms to measure the 
likelihood of tax officers’ having access to community information at a firm’s location, 
and examine its impacts on tax avoidance. I first proxy functional distance by the 
brightness of night light as captured by satellites. As brighter night light in an area 
indicates higher levels of economic and social activities in that area (Henderson et al. 
2012), and consequently a greater likelihood of tax officers’ visiting the area and 
having access to community information in the area, I hypothesize that the distance 
effect on tax avoidance is stronger if firm location is brighter than tax office location. 
I find results consistent with these hypotheses. I further examine the effects of 
community information on tax avoidance by using the opening of a new shopping mall 
within a community. The opening of shopping malls will increase the probability of 
tax officers’ visiting the area where the shopping malls are located. The probability of 
tax officers’ visiting a firm’s location and having access to the community information 
in the firm’s location will increase (decrease) if shopping malls are located near to (far 
away from) the firm. Thus, I hypothesize that the level of tax avoidance will decrease 
for firms located nearer shopping malls and increase for firms located farther from 
shopping malls. Using a difference-in-difference research design, I find results 
consistent with my hypothesis. Specifically, firms located near (within 3 km of) 
shopping malls engage in less tax avoidance, while firms located far away (at least 3 
km) from malls engage in more tax avoidance.  
In addition to my major analyses, I conduct a host of additional tests to verify the 
robustness of my main results. Overall, my results consistently suggest that the 
availability of community information at a firm’s location to tax officers can 
significantly influence tax avoidance.  
I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, my results have implications for 
the literature on determinants of tax avoidance. My study offers evidence that a new 
determinant—tax officers’ access to community information—can have a significant 
impact on the level of corporate tax avoidance. Second, I contribute to the strand of 
literature on the effects of community information in two ways. First, I extend the 
literature by demonstrating the effects of community information on regulatory 
effectiveness. Second, I create new proxies for the level of community information by 
using the brightness of night light as captured by satellites and the opening of new 
shopping malls. Lastly, my research findings have policy implications. My study 
suggests that the decentralization of tax collection systems can help to address the 
problem of information asymmetry between tax authorities and firms.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Community information” refers to soft information obtained from the local 
community through social interactions. The literature shows that community 
information can have significant impacts on various human behaviors (Bayer, Ross, 
and Topa 2008; Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, and Strobel 2018; Feng and Seasholes 2004; 
Perez-Truglia and Cruces 2017). However, little is known about whether government 
regulators obtain firm information from the community in which a firm is located, and 
whether such information acquisition influences regulatory effectiveness. This study 
focuses on a setting in China in which corporate taxes are collected by tax offices that 
are located very close to firms (with an average distance of 6.5 km), making the firms’ 
locations likely to be within tax officers’ sphere of daily activities. The study examines 
whether tax officers’ access to community information at a firm’s location affects 
corporate tax avoidance.  
Corporate tax avoidance is in essence an outcome of information asymmetry 
between tax authorities and firms. Prior studies examine the association between tax 
avoidance and the availability of various types of information to tax authorities, 
including soft information proxied by geographical distance between tax officers and 
firms (Kubick, Lockhart, Mills, and Robinson 2017), hard information collected by 
financial intermediaries (Chen and Lin 2017), and information provided by the public 
information sharing system (Beck, Lin, and Ma 2014). Complementing these studies, 
I seek to determine whether and how the availability of community information, which 
is an information source not examined in the existing literature, affects the ability of 
tax authorities to constrain corporate tax avoidance. 
My study focuses on the influence of community information at firms’ locations on 
tax officers. Studies document that soft information about firms tends to be 
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concentrated near a firm’s headquarters (Coval and Moskowitz 2001, 2002; Ivković 
and Weisbenner 2005). A large body of research shows that various market participants 
(such as institutional investors, individual investors, fund managers, and bank loan 
officers) tend to enjoy an information advantage if they are located near a firm’s 
headquarters.1 These studies support the existence of community information at the 
firm’s location, which can be accessed by economic agents whose daily activities take 
place in that location.  
Studies of soft information at a firm’s location suggest that the availability of this 
information to economic agents is a function of their geographic distance from that 
location. In these studies, the average geographic distance between the sample firms 
and their respective economic agents ranges from 16 km to 400 km (see Appendix A). 
My study differs from these previous studies in two ways. First, my study focuses on 
community information obtained during day-to-day activities carried out in close 
proximity to firms, rather than at distances of several hundred kilometers. Specifically, 
I examine the information tax officers obtain through interacting with the employees, 
managers, and neighbors of firms and by observing the firms’ local environments and 
communities. Petersen and Rajan (2002) suggest that close proximity facilitates 
personal interactions. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004, 2005) suggest that investors can 
easily gain information from friends and neighbors via word of mouth. In addition, 
proximity to a firm’s location allows tax officers to obtain information via 
observational learning.  
In addition to examining the effects of close geographic proximity, my study 
explores the influence of functional distance between tax offices and firms on the 
availability of community information to tax authorities. Research on human 
                                            
1
 Refer to Section 2.2 literature review.  
 
3 
 
information acquisition behaviors suggests that people acquire information both 
intentionally and unintentionally (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Reynolds 
2016; Bayer et al. 2008). Some studies suggest that when information cannot be 
directly obtained, people can instead access information incidentally via random 
contacts (Erdelez 1999; Williamson 1998; Gleaser 1997; Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker 
2014). Some studies have examined whether people’s proximity to “activity spaces,” 
such as mosques, playgrounds, public squares, kindergartens, local schools, and local 
markets, enables them to acquire community information. For example, health care 
utilization is higher if the health care provider is located within people’s activity space 
(Higgs 2009; Sherman, Spencer, Preisser, Gesler, and Arcury 2005).  
Functional distance has been used to measure the likelihood of people’s obtaining 
information unintentionally. It is the likelihood that neighbors will have unplanned 
contact due to the nature of the location and architecture (Festinger, Schachter, and 
Back 1950; Kabo, Cotton-Nessler, Hwang, Levenstein, and Owen-Smith 2014), or the 
likelihood that people will pass by a location or building in the course of other activities 
(Beshears et al. 2016). Several studies show that variation in functional distance can 
have a significant impact on social interactions and information exchange among 
members of a community (Festinger et al. 1950; Abu-Ghazzeh 1999; Wallace 1952). 
They suggest that when functional distance is small, the chance of casually meeting 
increases because residents make shorter but more frequent trips. Festinger et al. (1950) 
stress that on the basis of physical proximity, social interaction patterns such as 
friendship and marriage will develop as functional distance decreases. Al-Homoud 
(2015) shows that functional distance can be enhanced by different architectural 
features. For example, proximity to a local mosque is an important motivator of social 
interaction, as residents make frequent trips to this place of worship. Additionally, 
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proximity to children’s play areas is an important motivator of social interaction for 
parents.  
In my study, I adopt two measures to capture the level and change of functional 
distance between tax offices and firms. First, I proxy functional distance by the 
brightness of night illumination, as captured by satellites (Henderson, Storeygard, and 
Weil 2012). Brighter night illumination suggests greater economic and social activity. 
Tax officers are expected to be more likely to visit an area with more economic activity, 
and thus to engage in social interactions with people at a firm’s location or directly 
observe the firm’s operations. Thus, I use this measure to proxy for the functional 
distance between tax offices and firms, and examine how it may moderate the 
geographic distance effect on tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, I offer more solid evidence of the effects of functional distance on tax 
avoidance based on the opening of new shopping malls within communities. The 
opening of a shopping mall increases the probability of a tax officer’s visiting that area. 
Thus, the opening of a shopping mall is expected to change the functional distance 
between tax offices and firms while the geographic distance remains unchanged. I 
adopt a difference-in-difference research design, which allows me to isolate and 
examine how the change in functional distance induced by the opening of a mall can 
influence tax avoidance behaviors.  
I use Chinese publicly listed firms as my test sample. Two distinctive characteristics 
of the Chinese tax system make China an ideal setting for my investigation. First, in 
China, county tax offices collect taxes from firms. The field tax manager is thus located 
very close to the taxed firms. The short distance between firms and tax offices (an 
average distance of 6.5 km) suggests that tax officers are likely to have opportunities 
to communicate with managers, employees, and neighbors, and to directly observe 
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firm activities. Second, the Chinese tax system has a relatively weak legal framework 
(W. Wu, C. Wu, Zhou, and J. Wu 2012) and information environment. As tax law is 
unclear and its enforcement is frequently lax, the effectiveness of regulations in 
constraining tax avoidance remains relatively low in China. Nationally, the central 
government does not consider local financial distress when allocating tax power. Local 
tax offices operate under financial strain because local tax revenue is too limited to 
allow them to obtain comprehensive firm information. Hence, the hard information 
available to tax officers is frequently poor-quality and limited, which makes 
community information more important for detecting tax corporate avoidance 
behaviors in China.  
I develop four major hypotheses for empirical testing. First, I hypothesize that firms 
are less able to engage in tax avoidance when they are geographically closer to tax 
offices. Second, I hypothesize that the distance effect on tax avoidance is moderated 
by the level of connection between tax officers and firms via social networks. I use 
firm age and state ownership to measure the social networks of tax officers and firms. 
The more that tax officers know about firms, the more likely they are to have connected 
networks and to engage in social interactions.2 Third, brighter nighttime illumination 
in an area indicates a higher level of economic and social activity, making it more 
likely for tax officers to visit that area and gain access to community information there. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that the distance effect on tax avoidance is stronger if the 
firm’s location is brighter than the tax office’s location. Lastly, I hypothesize that the 
level of tax avoidance will decrease for firms located nearer shopping malls (in high 
                                            
2 Pool et al. (2014) suggest that managers might meet at a neighborhood park or school, or while taking the train 
to work. The longer they live near each other, the more opportunities to become friends will arise. Li, Yao, Chen, 
and Xi (2011) show that managers employed by state-owned enterprises possess more governmental connections—
conduits to become acquainted with government officials—than those employed by non-state-owned enterprises. 
Therefore, local SOEs are more likely than non-SOEs to have social connections and social interactions with tax 
officers.  
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information areas) and increase for firms farther away from shopping malls (in low 
information areas).  
I find results consistent with these hypotheses. Drawing on a sample of publicly 
listed firms from 2007 to 2016, I first use geographic distance to measure the 
likelihood of tax officers’ having access to community information at a firm’s location, 
and examine its effects on listed firms’ level of tax avoidance. I find that the level of 
tax avoidance is higher when tax offices and firms are located farther apart. The results 
show that a one standard deviation increase in distance leads to a 2.6 percent decrease 
in ETR. This difference roughly translates into a 13.5 percent decrease in overall GAAP 
ETR. Second, I find that the distance effect is stronger when tax officers and firms are 
socially connected.3 Third, I find that functional distance moderates the distance effect 
on tax avoidance. The results show that the relationship between geographic distance 
and tax avoidance is stronger if firms are located in an area with greater nighttime 
illumination than the area where the tax office is located. Finally, after the opening of 
a shopping mall, firms located within 3 km of the mall engage in less tax avoidance, 
while firms located more than 3 km away engage in more tax avoidance.  
In addition to my major analyses, I conduct a host of tests to verify the robustness 
of my main results. First, I provide evidence that the effect of the opening of shopping 
malls is moderated by firm age, ownership, nighttime illumination, county-level 
population density, parking spaces, and geographic distance. Second, I provide 
evidence concerning whether the effect of a new mall is more pronounced if the 
geometric angle of the tax office between the location of a firm and the location of the 
mall is large. Using this angle, I measure the likelihood of a tax officer’s passing by 
                                            
3 Additionally, I provide evidence that variation in firms’ accounting information moderates the effect of geographic distance 
on tax avoidance. Specifically, I find that the effect of geographic distance on tax avoidance is moderated by analyst coverage, 
abnormal accruals, firms audited by the Big Four, firm opaqueness, analyst forecast errors, and analyst forecast optimism. 
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the firm. Given the same distance, a small angle means that the firm and mall are not 
only located close to each other but in the same direction if the tax officer is heading 
from the tax office to the mall. As a result, when tax officers visit a mall after its 
opening, it is more likely that they will also visit or pass through the location of the 
firm’s headquarters. In contrast, if the angle is large, tax officers will be less likely to 
visit the mall and consequently to be diverted away from the firm’s location. Overall, 
my results consistently suggest that the availability to tax officers of community 
information at a firm’s location can significantly influence corporate tax avoidance. 
My study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the tax 
avoidance literature, especially the strand on the determinants of tax avoidance. My 
study offers evidence that tax officers’ access to community information can have a 
significant impact on firms’ tax avoidance behaviors. Kubick et al. (2017) demonstrate 
that geographic proximity influences the tax avoidance of firms in the U.S. My study 
differs from theirs in two important ways. Their study focuses on variation across a 
large area (an average distance of 54 miles), while my study focuses on variation across 
a smaller area (an average distance of 6.5 km). Thus, my study focuses on the 
information tax officers obtain from the location of their daily activities. 
Second, my study contributes to the literature on the effects of community 
information on human behaviors. I extend the literature by demonstrating the effects 
of community information on regulatory effectiveness. The previous literature has 
documented that community information can have significant impacts on various 
forms of human behavior, such as research collaboration (Kabo et al. 2014), labor 
market outcomes (Bayer et al. 2008), vaccination (Beshears et al. 2016), house 
purchase decisions (Bailey et al. 2018), partisan political participation (Perez-Truglia 
and Cruces 2017), peer effects in education (DeBartolome 1990; Benabou 1993; Epple 
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and Romano 1998), local human capital externalities and the persistence of inequality 
(Benabou 1996; Durlauf 1996), technological innovation (Gleaser 1999), and 
friendship formation (Hsieh and Lee 2016). Unlike previous research on individual 
information acquisition and behavior, I offer evidence that tax officers’ access to 
community information at a firm’s location can affect their monitoring effectiveness, 
as reflected by corporate tax avoidance.  
In addition, I create new proxies for the level of community information: the 
brightness of nighttime illumination as captured by satellites and the opening of new 
shopping malls. Community information is difficult to measure, as data on people’s 
functional distance are limited. Prior studies measure functional distance using various 
proxies, such as employees’ building entry/exit swipe card data (Beshears et al. 2016), 
church attendance (Hong et al. 2004), and overlapping pathways (Kabo et al. 2014). I 
use nighttime illumination and the opening of shopping malls to proxy for functional 
distance between tax offices and firms. My results show that tax avoidance is affected 
not only by close geographic proximity, but also by functional distance. 
Finally, this study has valuable policy implications for tax regulators. I call for the 
decentralization of the tax system to address the problem of information asymmetry 
between tax officers and firms. In particular, this type of information is important in 
emerging markets, where hard firm information is scarce and large credit-sharing 
databases remain undeveloped.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 explains my research design, including the 
identification strategy, data, sample selection procedure, and variable definitions. 
Section 4 presents my empirical results, including those of the main regression, cross-
sectional tests, and additional analyses. The final section concludes the paper and 
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suggests further areas for study.  
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2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Enterprise income tax was first introduced to China from Western countries on a 
piecemeal basis, beginning in 1936. In the wake of the “reform and opening up” policy 
announced in late 1978, China initiated a number of tax reforms to meet the needs of 
a market-oriented economy. Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, a system was adopted in which SOEs’ profits were paid to the central 
government; these profits comprised most of the national fiscal income. A reform was 
implemented in 1984 to improve the income tax system by applying it to SOEs and 
other types of domestic enterprises. Regulations imposed on SOE income tax 
transformed payments to the central government from profit delivery (li) to corporate 
income tax payments (shui).4  
In accordance with the goals of unifying tax laws, simplifying the tax system, 
making the tax burden more fair, and promoting competition, the 1994 reform 
separated national and local tax administrations. Before 1994, about two thirds of State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT) staff worked at the lowest level of government, with 
weak central supervision. Local staff developed close ties with local finance offices 
and local enterprises, which further weakened the central government’s control over 
revenue sharing. Since 1994, ‘‘local revenue’’ has been redefined as revenue from local 
taxes and the local portion of taxes shared with the central government. The central 
and provincial governments divide shared tax revenue according to a negotiated 
formula.5 National tax bureaus and local tax bureaus are responsible for collecting 
central taxes and local taxes, respectively. The 1994 reform, by establishing local tax 
                                            
4 http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/qysdsf/bjzl/200805/t20080519_26165.html 
5 In 2002, the central and local governments each received half of the revenue incremental to that collected in 2001. After 2002, the 
revenue sharing was adjusted to a 60/40 percent ratio in favor of the central government (Wu et al. 2012). 
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administrations, forced local tax services to take responsibility for local tax collection. 
Although the SAT still operates on a regional basis, it is independent of local tax 
administrations. This reform helped to solve the longstanding problem of divided 
loyalties among local officers in the SAT, and helped improve tax administration at 
both the national and local levels.  
However, compared with developed countries, several problems remain under the 
new system in China. A major problem is the lack of up-to-date, accurate tax record 
data available to the taxation system for budgeting and auditing. Underdeveloped 
banking and accounting systems and a weak information environment make it difficult 
to achieve efficient tax administration.  
China has tax offices at the central, province, prefecture, county, and village/town 
levels. Many new county tax offices have been built to ensure better tax administration 
for the growing number of local businesses. There are 766 county tax offices in my 
sample. The major functions of county tax offices are to implement tax regulations, 
collect tax payments, and maintain a database of firm information for the county. Firms 
located within a county or village/town file their tax returns with the county tax office 
in their jurisdiction. For example, firms make tax payments to the field tax manager 
(“税收管理员”) at the county tax office, which are then conveyed to the prefecture 
and ultimately to the provincial headquarters.6  
Since 2002, local tax bureaus have not collected enterprise income tax from newly 
established firms.7 Before 2009, the major local taxes are enterprise income taxes 
(from which central government enterprises are excluded), business taxes from sales 
                                            
6 How the field manager disburses tax payments to the various levels of government has varied. At different points in time, the 
government has adopted a strategy in which each level of tax office takes its cut before sending the remainder to the next level, 
and a strategy in which the whole sum goes to central government and is then apportioned.  
7 On January 1, 2002, the State Council enacted the “Income Tax Sharing Reform Act,” which changed the classification. Firms 
established before December 2001 pay enterprise income tax to local tax bureaus.  
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of services (reflected in sales and tax addition), and personal income tax (Wu et al. 
2012). After 2009, local tax bureaus have not collected enterprise income tax from 
firms that pay VAT.8 Despite these changes in policy, enterprise income tax payments 
remain one of the three major sources of local government tax revenue.9  
Tax collection and management oversight are primarily local. Prefecture-level tax 
offices are responsible for supervising county tax bureaus within the prefecture, but 
are not in direct contact with firms. A county is typically a community with a 
relatively small area. The area of the largest county in China is 270,000 km2, while 
the smallest is only 56 km2.10 Figure 1 is a map showing the Chaoyang tax office, 
the local area, and the firms under its jurisdiction. Firms in Chaoyang county are 
under the jurisdiction of the Chaoyang tax office. Specifically, listed firms 300049, 
601618, 002624, and 600795 are located 0.63 km, 0.81 km, 1.26 km, and 1.8 km 
from the Chaoyang county tax office, respectively. They are thus within walking 
distance of the tax office. The average distance between a firm and the tax office is 
6.5 km in my sample. Therefore, field tax managers (“税收管理员”) are located very 
close to firms under their jurisdiction.  
---insert Figure 1--- 
The media have reported numerous cases of tax officers in China using community 
information to detect tax avoidance. County tax officers seek out firm information. 
They frequently interact with firms’ employees, managers, and neighbors, and thus can 
deliberately or incidentally obtain community information about firms. Moreover, they 
can detect and investigate firm operations through direct observation of firm activities, 
such as observing vehicles and people entering and leaving the firm’s site. For example, 
                                            
8 China’s major tax reform was enacted in 2007, and the new enterprise income tax took effect in 2008. 
9 In 2017, the major shares of local tax revenue were VAT (40 percent), enterprise income tax (13.6 percent), and personal income 
tax (20.8 percent). Business tax has been replaced by VAT since 2016: https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/469825038.html  
10
http://old.pep.com.cn/rjwk/dlyd/2013_1/201301dlyd_1/201208dlyddlgj_1/201402/t20140225_1180439.htm 
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in 2009 a local newspaper reported that a Hunan tax office collected back taxes 
discovered through social interactions. The tax manager obtained suspicious 
information about the firm from chatting with someone who lived near it, and 
successfully collected 41,800 RMB in back taxes. In 2014, a tax officer in Wuxi 
collected back taxes from a textile firm based on information obtained through word 
of mouth and observation. By observing daily firm operations and talking informally 
with firm managers near the firm site, tax officers detected inconsistencies in the firm’s 
financial self-reporting. They investigated, found that the firm was engaging in tax 
avoidance, and collected 300,000 RMB in back taxes. These news stories are provided 
in full in Appendix B. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In this section, I review the previous literature on the effects of community information 
and the determinants of corporate tax avoidance by China’s listed firms. My research 
links directly to each of these research streams. At a basic level, I corroborate prior 
research on the link between geographic distance and soft information obtained near 
firms’ headquarters. I then extend prior research by delving into the “community effect” 
on economic decision-making.   
2.2.1 Community Information and its Impacts  
Numerous studies have shown that a significant amount of firm-specific soft 
information is available at the location of a firm’s headquarters, access to which 
influences economic agents’ decision-making. Prior studies focusing on the 
relationship between geography and finance indicate the existence of firm-specific 
information at a firm’s location and examine its effect on investors’ behaviors and firm 
behaviors. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001, 2002) find that fund managers 
have information advantages in relation to local firms, tend to trade more and earn 
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substantial abnormal returns from investments in nearby firms. Ivković and 
Weisbenner (2005) show that individual investors have substantial private information 
and tend to invest locally. Similarly, they find that the average household generates an 
additional annualized return of 3.2 percent from local holdings relative to non-local 
holdings. Using Chinese data, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that investors who live 
near a firm’s headquarters receive (on average) more precise information about the 
firm than those who live further away, but react similarly and correlatedly to 
information publicly released by the nearby firms. They suggest that soft information 
at a firm’s location influences investors’ trading behaviors. 
In addition, firms’ location has an impact on firm behaviors, such as mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, Ragozzino and Reuer (2009) report that acquirers who are 
geographically close to their targets are under higher perceived threat of adverse 
selection; in other words, a local bidder presumably holds an informational advantage 
over more distant competitors, but is more likely to be acquired. 
In addition to investor behaviors and firm behaviors, geographic proximity is often 
used as a measure of soft information between a borrower and lender, and researchers 
also examine its association with lending outcomes. For example, Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010) show that borrower proximity to lenders facilitates soft information 
acquisition, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit. Degryse and 
Ongena (2005) find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the 
lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks, 
suggesting that lending banks have superior information concerning nearby firms, 
which influences their lending decisions. Ghoul, Guedhami, Ni, Pittman, and Saadi 
(2013) find that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer to central locations, 
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implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information 
asymmetry is worse.  
Studies are providing increasing evidence that geographic proximity also influences 
the monitoring effectiveness of regulators and auditors. For example, Kubick et al. 
(2017) find that geographic proximity between corporate headquarters and regional 
IRS offices is associated with corporate tax avoidance and the likelihood and 
productivity of IRS inspection. Specifically, when located closer to the IRS, firms have 
more information about tax strategies and engage in more tax avoidance. Nguyen and 
Nguyen (2017) find that the SEC is more likely to investigate companies that are closer 
to its offices, and that illegal insider trading increases with a company’s distance from 
an SEC office. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that after firms announce an accounting 
restatement, the SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to SEC offices, 
and nearby firms engage in less corporate misconduct. Both studies suggest that the 
information gap between firms and the SEC is smaller when firms are nearby. Jha and 
Chen (2015) find that auditors’ fees depend on the social capital level of the firm’s 
location. They suggest that social capital at the location of a firm’s headquarters 
impacts how much auditors trust firms.  
Some studies also show that geographic proximity influences the behaviors of 
financial analysts. For example, Malloy (2005) finds that analysts make more accurate 
forecasts for closer firms and possess an information advantage for such firms over 
other analysts. The researcher also finds that local analysts affect prices more than 
other analysts, especially for firms located in small cities and remote areas.  
My study examines how the availability of community information to tax officers 
at the location of firms’ headquarters can influence tax avoidance. This availability 
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can be measured by both geographic distance and the likelihood of people engaging in 
social interactions with each other. 
Previous research shows that the information people obtain from their communities 
can have significant effects on career outcomes. For example, Hellerstein, McInerney, 
and Neumark (2011) and Hellerstein, Kutzbach, and Neumark (2014) find that 
residence-based labor market networks affect the labor outcomes of residents. They 
use residential proximity to capture “network connectedness,” measured as the 
percentage of neighbors among a worker’s coworkers, and find that it is important to 
the flow of labor market information among employers, employees, and potential hires. 
They suggest that the acquisition of residence-based information about jobs is 
associated with workers’ career outcomes. They also find that the relationship is 
stronger for minorities, less skilled workers, and especially Hispanics. Using 
exogenous variation in residential location, Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) find that 
information acquisition from the neighborhood is associated with rates of youth crime 
and delinquency. They find that residential relocation to less poor areas reduces arrests 
among female youth for violent and property crimes, relative to a control group. For 
males, residential relocation reduces arrests for violent crime, at least in the short run, 
but increases problem behaviors and property crime arrests. Kling et al. (2005) suggest 
that the relationship is caused by information-sharing about economic opportunities 
and educational access through social interactions. Using census data from Chicago, 
Topa (2001) examines the effect of local interactions on job referrals within residents’ 
social networks. The results indicate that the effect is stronger for low-skilled jobs and 
less-educated workers, and for black workers. Bayer et al. (2008) demonstrate that 
individuals residing in the same city block are 33 percent more likely to work at the 
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same company than those living in nearby blocks. They suggest that this relationship 
is caused by job referrals along social networks and local interactions among residents. 
Some studies also examine the effects of community on research collaboration and 
vaccination decisions. Kabo et al. (2014) use overlapping pathways in their 
university’s buildings to measure functional distance between researchers, and find 
that it is positively associated with research outcomes. Their findings show that 
architecture can affect functional distance, which can in turn influence the likelihood 
of social interactions and information exchange. Beshears et al. (2016) show that 
employees are significantly more likely to get vaccinated if they are more likely to 
walk by a clinic. 
Prior studies in finance and accounting also document the influence of “community 
effects,” in the form of word-of-mouth communication, on economic decision-making 
involving loans, investments, and corporate policy. For example, Hong et al. (2004) 
suggest that social households—those that interact with their neighbors or attend 
church—are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non-social 
households. Pool et al. (2014) show that neighbors with shared social connections 
through local schools or places of worship are more likely to communicate with each 
other, and therefore have similar holdings and trades. Brown et al. (2008) find that a 
ten percent increase in average ownership in one’s community leads to a four percent 
increase in the likelihood that an individual will own stocks. Bailey et al. (2018) find 
that individuals whose geographically distant friends experienced larger recent house 
price increases are more likely to transition from renting to owning. They argue that 
this is caused by the effects of social interactions on individuals’ housing market 
expectations. Information about the housing market is diffused through social 
interactions among friends and eventually influences individuals’ housing behavior. 
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Glaeser (1999) finds that people learn skills by chance through contact with more 
skilled neighbors. Using Chinese data, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that investors 
who open accounts in the same branch and physically trade in the same location tend 
to trade similarly in the stock market. Some researchers report that social interaction 
has a positive influence on stock market participation and its attractiveness in China 
(Liu et al. 2014; Li 2006). 
2.2.2 Mechanisms of Acquisition/Transmission of Community Information 
Previous studies suggest that people can acquire information through social 
interactions via word-of mouth communication and “observational learning” 
(Benanerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg 
1993, 1995). They suggest that potential investors may learn from others through 
social interactions either about information, such as the high returns that the market 
has historically offered, or about how to execute trades. According to Bernheim’s 
(1994) model of conformity, individuals may wish to maintain the same consumption 
as their social group, suggesting that information acquisition by one’s social group 
about a firm may influence one’s perception of it. This effect can also be explained by 
the external habit formation model proposed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004) show that a scarcity of local resources leads 
investors to care more about their relative wealth in the community, suggesting that 
individuals within a local community exchange information and ideas with others to 
acquire the same level of information as their neighbors. These models of word-of-
mouth interaction suggest that there is a relationship between community information 
and human behavior.   
I also briefly review recent related empirical works and show how information is 
obtained in these studies. Brown, Drake, and Martin (2008) suggest that individuals 
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may find it easier to learn how to open a mutual fund or brokerage account by talking 
to friends than through other mechanisms. Using Chinese data, Feng and Seasholes 
(2004) find a significant “within-branch” trading pattern, suggesting that investors 
trading in the same room engage in a large number of social interactions, leading to 
information acquisition about stock prices that influences investor trading behaviors. 
Pool et al. (2014) find that fund managers residing in the same neighborhood share 
considerably more information about holdings and trades than those who live in the 
same city but in different neighborhoods, and are therefore more likely to have 
overlapping funds.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that social interactions are a source of 
information, some argue that face-to-face contact does not affect access to information. 
For example, Cairncross (2001) suggests that the rise of instantaneous communication 
technology such as the Internet, e-mail, and mobile phones has led to the “death of 
distance.” For example, people tend to use mobile phones for e-commerce rather than 
going to malls. However, Clark (2007) suggests that this does not mean that physical 
travel or face-to-face contact is now redundant. Urry (2002, 2003) suggests that travel 
has increased in frequency and distance and produced more dispersed and flexible 
social ties, which are maintained through complex processes of physical co-presence. 
Most studies focusing on information obtained from daily social interactions do not 
distinguish whether the information is obtained intentionally or unintentionally by 
economic agents. For example, studies show that people learn from small talk (Fischer 
and Stocken 2001, 2010; Dessein and Kartik 2013), gossip (Jelasity 2011; Banerjee, 
Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2016), whistle blowing (Wilde 2017), awareness 
of SEC enforcement (Defond, Francis, and Hallman 2017; Guiso and Jappelli 2005), 
and word of mouth (Hong et al. 2004). However, soft information can be obtained both 
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intentionally and unintentionally. For example, people can obtain a piece of 
information by directly asking questions during social interactions or by incidentally 
hearing about it. The fact that economic agents usually have less information about 
firms located farther away may be due to lower intentional and unintentional 
information acquisition. While high travel costs reduce people’s incentives to directly 
seek information about distant firms, high travel costs prevent them from visiting a 
distant firm’s location for other purposes, making them less likely to unintentionally 
obtain firm information. 
Social scientists, however, emphasize that people can obtain useful information 
incidentally in the course of daily life. Unintentional information-gathering may occur 
when one is looking for information relating to one topic and discovers information 
relating to another. However, it also occurs when one unexpectedly encounters 
information while engaged in a routine activity. This type of interaction, which 
Festinger et al. (1950) define as “passive contact,” occurs most often when people meet 
at “required paths” and have face-to-face encounters. As Festinger et al. (1950) note: 
 
“Passive contacts are determined by required paths followed in entering or leaving 
one’s home for any purpose. For example, in going from one’s door to the stairway 
one must pass certain apartments; in walking to the butcher shop one must go by a 
certain house. These specific required paths are determined by the physical structure 
of the area.” 
 
Recent studies document unintentional information acquisition during social 
interactions. For example, Glaeser (1999) finds that people learn skills by chance 
through contact with more skilled neighbors. Thus, those living in cities learn faster 
given the higher probability of meeting people they can learn from. Glaeser also finds 
that the probability of learning is affected by the proportion of skilled people in the 
community and the density of the community. That is, individuals living in denser 
areas are assumed to have more frequent contact with others. Bertrand, Luttmer, and 
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Mullainathan (2000) find that being surrounded by others who speak the same 
language increases welfare use more in high welfare-using language groups. They 
suggest that in a neighborhood that has a high concentration of speakers of such a 
language, there is a greater likelihood of learning from neighbors and information 
spillover about welfare eligibility. Pool et al. (2014) show that managers who live 
together have a better chance of being friends and have more ongoing social 
interactions due to a higher probability of random encounters in places such as local 
schools or places of worship. They suggest that information about trading and 
investing is transferred through such informal person-to-person relationships. Bayer et 
al. (2008) find that individuals who reside in the same block are more likely to work 
together than individuals living in nearby blocks. One study suggests that people 
obtain information unintentionally when they pass through a clinic (Beshears et al. 
2016). In their analysis of support for political parties, Perez-Truglia and Cruces (2017) 
find that when an individual’s political contributions are more visible to her neighbors, 
the number of supporters of her party increases and the number of supporters of the 
opposing party decreases. They suggest that neighbors acquire information about an 
individual’s political contributions unintentionally when they pass by political signs 
on their property.  
2.2.3 Measurement of Community Information 
There are three ways of measuring community information: physical distance, 
functional distance, and social networks. The key to distinguishing between the first 
two is that functional distance involves locational or architectural considerations. It is 
well documented that the level of community information can be measured by physical 
distance. I stress that the level of community information can be measured by both 
close physical proximity and functional distance. Functional distance is conceptually 
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distinct from physical proximity. For example, a person in a city may be physically 
very close to a person who lives in the building across the street, but the functional 
distance is high because they are not likely to come into frequent contact. Al-Homoud 
(2015) shows that proximity to functional elements, such as mosques, playgrounds, 
public squares, kindergartens, local schools, and local markets, is a major predictor of 
social interactions. Specifically, access to local shops and other retail venues increases 
pedestrian traffic and encourages chance encounters and interactions. The paths 
required for carrying out daily activities increase the opportunities for passive contact. 
These specific paths are determined and affected by the physical structure of the setting 
(see Festinger et al. 1950). Moreover, Festinger et al. (1950) stress that the smaller the 
physical distance, the greater the number of required paths shared by neighbors, which 
increases the probability of passive contact.  
Analyzing the economic effects of community information has proved challenging, 
in large part because of the absence of high-quality data that can be linked to outcome 
variables of interest. Earlier studies use close geographic proximity to capture the 
amount of community information. In particular, the number of street blocks is used 
to examine the effect of geographic proximity on friendship, marriage, etc. 
Functional distance seems like a useful measure of the level of community 
information, but measuring it is challenging due to data limitations. Hong et al. (2004) 
measure functional distance through interactions with neighbors and church 
attendance. Bayer et al. (2008) measure functional distance based on residence in the 
same city block, and assume that living in the same block increases the chance of 
people’s meeting each other incidentally. Kabo et al. (2014) measure functional 
distance by pathway overlap. Gruber (2005) measures sociability by religious 
participation. Using employees’ building entry/exit swipe card data, Beshears et al. 
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(2016) test whether functional distance, the likelihood that an employee will walk past 
a clinic, predicts whether the employee will get vaccinated at that clinic. Functional 
distance is also widely used in analysis of serial murders (Kent, Leitner, and Curtis 
2006; Canter, Alison, Alison, and Wentink 2004).  
Other than the first two measurements, community information can be measured by 
local social networks. Prior studies show that social networks proxy for the level of 
private information delivered among people connected within the network. For 
example, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) find that portfolio managers invest more 
heavily in connected firms and perform significantly better on these holdings relative 
to their nonconnected holdings. Cohen et al. (2009) find that managers invest in 
companies to which they are linked through school networks. Pool et al. (2014) find 
that neighbors who share social connections through local schools or places of worship 
have similar holdings and make similar trades. Political connections have been found 
to weaken the ability of tax enforcement to constrain tax avoidance in China (Lin et al. 
2017). Menon and Williams (2004) find that firms employing connected former 
partners as officers or directors report larger signed and unsigned abnormal accruals 
than other firms. 
Some studies also take confounding factors into consideration when examining the 
effect of community information. Hong et al. (2004) try to rule out personal 
characteristics by showing that in states where more individuals participate in the stock 
market, the effect of social networks is much stronger. Hong et al. (2005) distinguish 
word-of-mouth effects from local preferences by showing that a fund manager tends 
to buy/sell a particular stock if other managers in the same city buy/sell the same stock. 
Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) and Pool et al. (2014) disentangle social interaction 
from community effects using neighborhood information. Brown, Ivković, Smith and 
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Weisbenner (2008) implement instrumental variables for the average stock ownership 
in an individual’s community with the lagged average stock ownership of the states in 
which the individual’s non-native neighbors were born. Shive (2010) avoids the 
endogeneity problem using a measure of the rate of transmission of diseases and 
rumors through social contact. Algan, Hemet, and Laitin (2016) find that exogenous 
residential allocation induces social anomie and a demand for better buildings. They 
argue that ethnic diversity reduces social relationships and makes people less socially 
connected. Bailey et al. (2018) use the effects of plausibly exogenous variation in the 
recent house price experiences of individuals’ geographically distant friends on those 
individuals’ local housing market perceptions to identify the network effect on housing 
market investment decisions. Hsieh and Lee (2016) examine the relationship between 
friendship and social interactions and use a modeling approach to solve the 
endogeneity bias problem caused by associations of members within a network. 
2.2.4 Literature on Tax Avoidance 
Previous studies show that tax avoidance activities are associated with firm 
characteristics, ownership concentration, compensation contracts, and agency 
problems (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Chen et al. 2018; Armstrong et al. 2012; 
Atwood et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 2012; Brown et al. 2013). For example, Chen, 
Huang, Li, and Shevlin (2018) find that higher quasi-indexer ownership leads to 
greater tax avoidance. The value of quasi-indexers’ holdings is enhanced through 
greater tax savings and improved overall firm performance, because the value of their 
holdings helps them attract new fund inflows. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) 
find that the incentive compensation of tax directors has a strong negative relationship 
with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with other tax attributes. Using 
a sample of U.S. firms, Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) find that on average, 
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firms engage in less tax avoidance when required book-tax conformity is higher, a 
worldwide approach is used, and tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. Rego 
and Wilson (2012) observe a positive relationship between top executives’ equity risk 
incentives and tax avoidance. They suggest that after-tax incentives increase the 
aggressiveness of CEOs’ tax management efforts and eventually lead to tax avoidance 
behavior. Brown et al. (2013) find that bonus payments for CEOs and CFOs are 
associated with tax avoidance behaviors (as reflected by low cash ETRs). However, 
this effect is only present in firms with relatively low tax risk (as proxied by low 
unrecognized tax benefits). They suggest that opportunities to incentivize managers to 
engage in general tax avoidance have to be evaluated in the light of overall firm tax 
risk preferences. 
Several studies find that tax avoidance is associated with information-based 
determinants. For example, Kubick et al. (2017) find that corporations engage in more 
tax avoidance when located closer to an IRS office, unless they are close to an IRS 
industry specialist. They propose two possible effects of geographical proximity 
between IRS offices and firms. First, the IRS can obtain more firm information. 
Second, firms can obtain information about the IRS. Kubick et al.’s (2017) results 
support the second effect: being close to IRS offices allows firms to engage in more 
tax avoidance by obtaining an informational advantage concerning tax officers’ 
strategies. Chen and Lin (2017) find that analyst coverage is associated with tax 
avoidance. They suggest that information acquisition by financial intermediaries can 
reduce information asymmetry between firms and tax authorities. Liu et al. (2014) find 
that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher 
branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree.  
Using Chinese data, Tang, Mo and Chan (2017) find that conflicts between central 
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and local governments arising from the 2002 tax-sharing reform have increased tax 
avoidance among local government-controlled firms. Lin et al. (2018) find that 
political connections weaken tax enforcement in China. Bradshaw, Liao, and Ma (2018) 
investigate publicly traded firms in China and find that SOEs engage in significantly 
less tax avoidance than non-SOEs. The differences are strongest for locally versus 
centrally owned SOEs, and during years in which SOE term performance evaluations 
occur. Using a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, Wong, Lo and Firth (2015) find 
that firms generally choose to manage their taxable income upward in a book-tax non-
conforming manner rather than in a book-tax conforming manner before a tax rate 
increase, which in turn reduces the risk of detection for aggressive financial reporting. 
Lo, Wong and Firth (2010) find that corporate tax avoidance behavior is associated 
with the transfer pricing decisions of Chinese listed firms. They argue that this is 
caused by the opportunistic managerial use of domestic transfer pricing to manage 
earnings by transferring taxes from one firm in a group of companies to another firm 
in the group or to the owner. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Proximity facilitates investors’ access to firm information at a firm’s location (Coval 
and Moskowitz 2002; Feng and Seasholes 2004). For example, Coval and Moskowitz 
(2002) find that U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally 
headquartered firms and earn abnormal returns on their local holdings, which is 
consistent with the information advantage of location proximity. They further show 
that these funds’ better performance results from improved monitoring capabilities and 
access to private information on geographically proximate firms. Focusing on the 
Chinese market, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that investors who live near a firm’s 
headquarters have more precise information on the firm’s fundamentals and react in a 
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similar manner to releases of public information. In line with the notion that proximity 
enhances information acquisition, Nguyen and Nguyen (2017) find that firms are more 
likely to be investigated by the SEC and hence commit less illegal insider trading when 
they are located closer to the SEC’s offices. This suggests that when firms are close to 
the SEC’s offices, regulators may acquire more information about these firms and 
reduce their illegal trading activities.11 
Numerous studies show that firms’ ability to engage in tax avoidance is associated 
with information asymmetry between tax officers and firms (Liu et al. 2014; Lin et al. 
2017; Kubick et al. 2017). For example, measuring information asymmetry using 
analyst coverage, Chen and Lin (2017) find that firms with high analyst coverage tend 
to pay a low effective tax rate. Additionally, Liu et al. (2014) find that better credit 
information sharing and bank penetration reduce tax avoidance, suggesting that 
information provided by the public information-sharing system affects corporate tax 
avoidance.   
To some extent, it would seem that proximity facilitates tax officers’ information 
acquisition and reduces their information gap relative to firms. The closer a firm is to 
a tax office, the easier it is for tax officials to access firm information, and the more 
difficult for the firm to avoid taxes. However, there is also evidence that a small 
geographic distance results in more tax avoidance or has no effect on it (Brown 2011; 
Kubick et al. 2017). For example, Kubick et al. (2017) show that geographic proximity 
is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. They argue that a short 
geographic distance gives firms access to information about regulators’ monitoring 
strategies, which in turn allows them to evade more taxes.  
                                            
11 The average distance in their sample is 184 km. Although this paper has a similar focus on regulators’ access to firm 
information, Nguyen and Nguyen (2017) do not focus on the community information obtained by regulators within the area of 
their daily activities.  
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The relationship between the geographic distance between firms and tax offices and 
the level of firm tax avoidance is therefore theoretically unclear. The relationship may 
be positive or negative, depending on whether it gives tax officers more information 
about firms or gives firms more information about tax officers. Nevertheless, for 
empirical testing, I hypothesize that geographic proximity between tax offices and 
firms deters corporate tax avoidance. I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1. All else being equal, geographic proximity between firms and tax offices is 
significantly and positively related to the extent to which firms engage in tax avoidance. 
 Second, I investigate the effects of two potential cross-sectional moderators of the 
hypothesized relationship between geographic proximity and tax avoidance. I first 
consider the effects of the social connectedness of firms and the social connectedness 
of tax officers. I use firm’s age and state ownership to proxy the social connectedness 
of firms and tax officers. (SOE, Local SOE, Established Age, Listed Age, and 
Community Age). I expect that they can moderate the distance effect via two channels, 
namely, social networks and tax regulators’ pre-existing knowledge (familiarity with 
taxpayers). For the social network effect, tax officers are more likely to know the 
people from state-owned firms. Pool et al. (2014) suggest that managers may meet at 
a neighborhood park or school, or while taking the train to work. The longer they live 
near each other, the more such opportunities will arise for them to become friends. Li 
et al. (2011) show that Chinese managers employed by state-owned enterprises possess 
more governmental connections—channels for meeting government officials—than 
those employed by non-state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, more people in a 
community will know a firm if the firm has located in a community for a longer period. 
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This, I expect such social connectedness will increase the chance for tax officers and 
people from or located near the firms to engage in social interactions.12  
For the pre-existing knowledge effect, tax officers tend to have more pre-existing 
knowledge about state-owned firms and firms located in a community for a longer 
period than the other firms. As information obtained unintentionally are clues or hints 
rather than substantiate and systematic information. this information is more 
informative or tend to have a higher diagnostic power for firms that people already 
have a certain level of understanding rather than those they have little understanding.  
As a result, I expect that tax officers can obtain more useful information on SOEs 
and older firms than non-SOEs and younger firms, even the distance between firms 
and tax office is the same. I thus propose the following hypothesis: 
H2. All else being equal, geographic distance effects are stronger in older firms and 
state-owned enterprises.  
The second moderator I examine is functional distance. The literature on incidental 
information acquisition suggests that the information people obtain is a function not 
only of geographic distance but also of functional distance. A shorter functional 
distance between a tax office and a firm will increase the probability of tax officers’ 
visiting the firm’s location daily. That is, given the same geographic distance between 
firms and tax officers, the likelihood of tax officers’ visiting firms’ locations will 
depend on the firms’ architectural features. A few studies support the effects of 
functional distance on incidental information flow. For example, Beshears et al. (2016) 
find that people randomly passing by a clinic have a higher propensity to get 
vaccinated. Bayer et al. (2008) demonstrate that individuals residing in the same city 
                                            
12 Although state ownership can also capture the government influence, but the government influences does not 
have the same predictive power on tax avoidance measures. 
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block are more likely to work together than those in nearby blocks. Gleaser (1999) 
finds that people learn from skilled neighbors via random contacts. Pool et al. (2014) 
find that neighbors have a higher probability of interacting through random encounters, 
and that these random encounters are the main means of the transmission of ideas.  
I expect tax officers to have greater access to community information if the 
functional distance between tax offices and firms is shorter. To measure functional 
distance, I use the brightness of nighttime illumination as captured by satellites 
(Henderson et al. 2012). Nightlight illumination is a good measure of functional 
distance. When a firm’s location is lighter than tax office’s location, tax officers are 
more likely to visit the firm’s location in their daily life activities (because more 
economic and social activities are taking place there). As a result, it will imply the 
existence of a shorter functional distance between firms and tax offices, and 
consequently increase the likehood of tax officers to obtain firm-specific information 
in the firm’s location. Tax officers are more likely to visit an area with greater 
economic activity and consequently to have random contact with people there, which 
leads to higher amount of unintentional information acquisition. As a result, I expect 
tax officers to be more likely to travel to a firm when its location is brighter (vs. darker) 
than the tax office’s location, decreasing the functional distance between the two.13 
Hence, I expect the geographic distance effect to be stronger if the functional distance 
between tax offices and firms is smaller.  
Building on the preceding discussion, I test the following hypothesis: 
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H3. All else being equal, the relationship between geographic proximity and tax 
avoidance is stronger (weaker) if the firm location is brighter (darker) than the tax 
office location.  
H3 predicts that the relationship between geographic distance and tax avoidance is 
moderated by the effect of functional distance. The opening of a shopping mall is a 
good setting for demonstrating the effects of functional distance on tax avoidance, 
because it changes the functional distance between tax offices and firms without 
changing the physical distance between them. To test this hypothesis, I focus on a 
Chinese real estate company, Wanda Group, that opened shopping malls in 128 
counties during the sample period.14 
As discussed in the literature review, studies on incidental information acquisition 
suggest that proximity to functional elements facilitates information acquisition 
through social interactions and observational learning (e.g. Al-Homoud 2015). I expect 
the opening of a shopping mall to serve a similar function, because a shopping mall is 
a location for daily activities such as eating, shopping, and entertainment.  
I expect the opening of new shopping malls to change the functional distance 
between tax office and firms while the geographic distance between firms and tax 
offices remains the same. Furthermore, the opening of shopping malls is unlikely to 
affect other determinants of tax avoidance, such as corporate governance and 
managerial compensation. Specifically, I expect the effect of a mall opening on the 
functional distance between a specific tax office and a firm to depend on whether the 
mall is close or far away from the firm. 
                                            
14 Wanda Group has continuously built new shopping malls since opening its first shopping malls in 2001, and has grown 
dramatically since 2007. By the end of 2016, it had more than 130 franchise shopping malls. Wanda Group ranks no. 1 in China 
overall, and owns the largest amount of real estate worldwide (2017 Commercial Real Estate in China Top 10). See 
https://jingyan.baidu.com/article/1876c85273c7cb890a137663.html. 
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Tax officers pass by multiple spaces during their daily activities. Community 
information tends to be concentrated at the location of the firm headquarters (Coval 
and Moskowitz 2001, 2002). If the new shopping mall is located near a firm, this will 
increase the chance that tax officers will visit the firm location while they are traveling 
to the mall. As a result, the functional proximity between tax offices and firms will be 
increased, and tax officers are likely to have better access to community information, 
either by interacting with people in the community where the firm is located or by 
observing the people and environment there (Higgs 2009; Sherman 2015; Beshears et 
al. 2016; Perez-Truglia and Cruces 2017). 
However, if the new mall is located far away from a firm, tax officers will be less 
likely to visit the firm’s location when they are visiting the mall. As a result, the 
opening of a faraway mall will reduce the functional proximity between firms and tax 
offices and reduce the likelihood that tax officers will have access to community 
information about the firm when the tax officers visit the mall. Furthermore, assuming 
that the opening of a shopping mall does not significantly change the amount of time 
that tax officers spend on daily life activities, an increase in the probability of visiting 
the mall location will reduce the probability of visiting the firm location. This 
substitution effect will further reduce the likelihood that tax officers will have access 
to community information at the firm location.  
Altogether, I propose the following hypothesis for testing: 
H4. The opening of a shopping mall near (far away from) a firm will increase 
(reduce) the chance of tax officers visiting the firm’s location, which will increase 
(reduce) the amount of information acquired by tax officers about the firm and 
consequently reduce (increase) the firm’s tax avoidance. 
In addition, the attractiveness and presence of good facilities within different 
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shopping malls may affect the probability of making visits to the mall location by tax 
officers, and that yield different amounts of unintentional community information. I 
proxy for the attractiveness of and presence of good facilities within new shopping 
malls using a time invariant variable: the number of parking spaces in the malls. My 
prediction is that more parking lots in the new shopping malls represent more 
attractiveness and presence of good facilities and entertainments, lead to stronger mall 
opening effect on tax avoidance. Formally I propose that:  
H5. The effect of the opening of a shopping mall on tax avoidance is associated with 
the number of parking spaces in the shopping mall.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Variable Measures 
3.1.1 Measure of tax avoidance 
I use two measures of firms’ tax avoidance. The first is effective tax rate (ETR), which 
is defined as annual total income tax expense divided by pre-tax book income. 
Previous researchers such as Tang et al. (2017) also use this measure.  
The second measure is the modified effective tax rate (METR), the ratio of income 
tax expense scaled by adjusted taxable income in baseline regressions (METR) (see 
Wu et al. 2012). Chinese income tax policy considers adjusted taxable income, which 
adjusts for asset depreciation reserves excluding provisions for bad debts, and 
investment returns other than cash dividends and bond interest.15  
Some studies show that low effective tax rates are due to governments’ preferential 
tax treatment and not a symptom of tax avoidance. To address this problem, some 
studies use adjusted ETR, which is defined as effective tax rate scaled by applicable 
tax rate (ATR) (Chow, Ke, Yuan, and Zhang 2018) Due to data limitations on 
applicable tax rates, I do not use this measure. The book-tax difference is also used, 
but estimates of taxable income are prone to error, so few researchers use this measure. 
Although some accounting changes and tax reforms were enacted over the sample 
period,16 they affected all firms and thus should be controlled to a large extent by my 
robustness check and difference-in-differences research design. 
3.1.2 Measure of geographic distance 
                                            
15 As in Wang (2003), the adjusted taxable income is calculated as profit before tax plus asset depreciation reserves excluding 
provisions for bad debts, minus investment returns plus cash dividends received plus cash bond interest received. Asset 
depreciation reserves excluding provisions for bad debts are added to taxable income because they cannot be deducted from 
taxable income. Investment returns are subtracted from taxable income, while cash dividends and cash bond interest received are 
added, because investment income other than cash dividends and bond interest is not taxable. I also use cash flow from operations 
to replace adjusted taxable income to calculate ETR in robustness tests. 
16 China adopted international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2007, and China’s major tax reform was enacted in 2007 
(effective in 2008); thus the new enterprise income tax has been in effect since 2008. 
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I hand-collected addresses of county-level tax offices year by year and obtained the 
addresses of all listed firms’ headquarters from the Wind database.17 Based on the 
collected addresses, I identify the latitudes and longitudes of the tax offices and firms’ 
headquarters using Google Maps.18  
I use two measures of geographic distance between the headquarters of listed firms 
and their affiliated tax offices. First, I create Distance, which is the logarithm of 1 plus 
the distance in kilometers (km) between the firm headquarters and the tax office, to 
reduce the effects of extreme observations. Second, I define Close, which equals 1 if 
the distance between the firm headquarters and tax office is smaller than the sample 
mean (6.5 km), and 0 otherwise.  
Some researchers argue that daily human activity tends to be confined to a given 
area, and that people are much less likely to visit areas beyond those limits. I limit the 
distance to within 1 km, 2 km…, etc., and run the baseline regression models on the 
effects of Distance accordingly. I find that the magnitude of distance effects is 
negligible if the distance is more than 10 km. I define a metric, effDistance, calculated 
as the joint product of the actual distance in km and the top decile of Distance (1 = 
<10 km, 0 otherwise), so that Distance = 0 until it reaches the top decile. Finally, I 
measure geographic distance according to travel time and distance by car (Distance 
car and Duration car) and travel time and distance by bike (Distance bike and 
Duration bike), to incorporate travel costs into the measures of distance (Coval and 
Moskowitz 2001). 
                                            
17 There are three cases in which the distance between firms and tax offices changes: 1) the corresponding county-level tax 
office changes its address; 2) the firm’s monitoring tax office changes; 3) the firm changes its address. I exclude firms that 
change their address more than four times. 
18 Following Coval and Moskowitz (2001), I calculate the distance between tax office and firms by using the arc-length 
formula, as shown below: 
Distancei, j = acrccoss{cos(lati)cos(loni)cos(lonj) + cos(lati)sin(loni)cos(lati)sin(lonj) + sin(lati)sin(latj)}2πr/360 
where r is the radius of the earth (6378km), lat is latitude and lon is longitude. I define Distancei,j as the natural logarithm of 1 
plus Distancei,j.  
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3.1.3 Measures of functional distance 
I measure the functional distance between tax office and firms using the brightness of 
nighttime illumination captured by satellites. I define Bright, which equals 1 if the 3 
km × 3 km square centered at the firm location is brighter than the square centered at 
the tax office location (this is referred to as a high information area), and 0 otherwise. 
I further measure the change in functional distance using the opening of new shopping 
malls. I create Mall to indicate the number of firm-year observations in counties where 
a new shopping mall has been opened, and 0 otherwise.  
3.2. Model Specifications 
I test H1 using the following regression: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 + α2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖, 𝑡 + α3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 + α4𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖, 𝑡
+ α5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 + α6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + α7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖, 𝑡 + α8𝐶𝐼𝑖, 𝑡 + α9𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖, 𝑡
+ α10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 + α11𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖, 𝑡
+ 𝛼14𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛴𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛴𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡                           (1) 
where i and t index firms and year, respectively. The dependent variable is one of the 
two annual effective tax rate measures (ETR and METR multiplied by 100). My 
variables of interest include 1) geodesic distance between the tax office and firm (km), 
2) Distance variables, and 3) dummy variables coded as 1 if the firm located within 2 
km, 3 km, 4 km, or 5 km of the tax office. Across all model specifications, I include 
industry-year joint fixed effects and county fixed effects to control for industry 
conditions and changes in tax regulations and policy that differ across years, industries, 
and county-level economic factors. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 
2009). I also consider whether my main results are sensitive to other measures of tax 
avoidance in the sensitivity tests, including one-year Total ETR, three-year book ETR, 
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three-year lagged ETR, and three-year cash ETR (Bradshaw et al. 2018), adjusted or 
unadjusted for size and industry effects (Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Lin et al. 2017).  
Following the prior literature, I include control variables that are likely to affect tax 
avoidance (see Tang et al. 2017). I include the following firm-specific characteristics: 
profitability (ROA) (the ratio of net income to total assets), the standard deviation of 
ROA (SD_ROA), firm size (Size) (the natural logarithm of market capitalization), 
intangibility (INTAN) (intangible assets divided by total assets), financial leverage 
(Leverage) (total debt over total assets), tangibility (PPE) (ratio of net PPE to total 
assets), growth (Tobin’s Q) (market value scaled by net book value of assets), free cash 
flow (FCF) (ratio of free cash flow to total assets), firm age (Age) (natural logarithm 
of the number of years the firm has been listed), employment (Employee) (natural 
logarithm of the number of employees), net operating loss (NOL) (equal to 1 if the 
firm reports a positive net operating loss carryforward during the year, and 0 otherwise), 
capital intensity (CI) (net fixed assets divided by total assets), and state ownership 
(SOE) (equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise). I also 
include industry-year joint fixed effects and county fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm level (Petersen 2009). I control for industry fixed effects instead of 
firm fixed effects. Including firm FE instead of industry FE will cause the problem of 
multicollinearity.  
I include county fixed effects in the model specifications to control for time invariant 
county-specific characteristics, and I also include county-level population density and 
city-level macroeconomic factors to control for the time variant differences in county 
economic and institutional conditions. Following Tang et al. 2017, these are 
Population density, the natural logarithm of the number of residents in the county in 
which the firm is located; GDP, the natural logarithm of a city’s annual gross domestic 
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product; Fiscal income, the natural logarithm of a city’s annual fiscal income; and 
Fiscal expenditure, the natural logarithm of a city’s annual fiscal expenditure. Because 
data on these macroeconomic variables are available only for some years, I include the 
results in the robustness check section rather to treat them as main tests.  
To test H2, I interact the Distance variable and Close variables with the social 
network variables in Model (1). I proxy the effect of social networks using the 
following variables: Established Age, the number of years the firm has been 
established; Listed Age, the number of years the firm has been listed; Community Age, 
the number of years the firm has been located in the community; and Local SOE, equal 
to 1 if the firm is a local state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise.  
To test H3, I employee a regression analysis with interaction terms to analyze the 
effect of functional distance on the geographic distance effect. I identify firm-years 
that change their nighttime illumination status from 0 (i.e., Bright = 0) to 1 (i.e., Bright 
= 1). I start from 8,288 firm-years observations in the nightlight sample from 2007 to 
2013. I then estimate the following DID regression: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖, 𝑡 + α2𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 + α3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 × 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖, 𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖, 𝑡 + Σ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ Σ𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡          , (2) 
where Bright is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s location is brighter than 
the tax office’s location, and 0 otherwise. Close equals 1 for firm-year observations if 
firms are located within 6.5 km of the tax office, and 0 otherwise. Following Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003), I test H4 in Model (3): 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = α0 + α1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 + Σ𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ Σ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡            , (3) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. Control denotes the control variables. Malli,t 
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is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a new shopping mall has been opened by time t in 
the county where firm i is located and εi,t is an error term. My estimate of the mall 
effect is α1.  
3.3. Sample Selection 
I hand-collected county-level population density (total number of residents / county 
area) from the Chinese National Census and projected the missing data by population 
growth. I obtained DMSP-OLS satellite nightlight data from NASA. Macroeconomic 
and fiscal data, such as GDP, total government revenue, and expenditure by region, 
were collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (see 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/engish/). I hand-collected information on Wanda shopping 
malls and the dates of their openings from http://www.wandaplaza.cn. I hand-collected 
information on nine other non-Wanda shopping malls from their official websites.19 I 
also hand-collected information on changes in firm headquarters during the sample 
period from firm announcements. Other financial information was extracted from the 
Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Detailed 
variable definitions and data sources are presented in Appendix C.  
Table 1 presents the sample selection. I limit the sample to the 2007-2016 period 
because records of the addresses of county-level tax offices before 2007 are scarce. 
Beginning with a population of 23,328 non-financial A-share listings, I exclude (i) 
5,285 observations with missing variables, and (ii) 1,919 firm-years with an ETR equal 
or greater than 1, or with negative income tax expense or negative pre-tax income.  
---insert Table 1--- 
Table 2 tabulates the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, independent 
                                            
19 I obtained the list of Top 10 most successful commercial shopping malls from 
https://jingyan.baidu.com/article/1876c85273c7cb890a137663.html, and hand collected the addresses of the malls nationwide 
and their opening time from either their official websites, or Baidu.  
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variables, and control variables. To prevent outliers from unduly affecting my results, 
I winsorize the top and bottom one percentile of all scaled variables. I also generate a 
Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables used in Model (1). ETR and METR are 
correlated at 0.71, suggesting that they both measure the level of tax avoidance. The 
tax avoidance measures are negatively correlated with distance, ROA, and FCF, but 
positively correlated with INTAN, PPE, LEV, NOL, CI, Age, SOE, and Employee. The 
correlation table is not reported for brevity. 
---insert Table 2--- 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Effect of Geographic Distance 
4.1.1 Baseline Regressions Testing the Empirical Relationship between Distance 
and Tax Avoidance 
In this section I assume that all areas within a country are homogeneous in terms of 
attractiveness to tax officers. I focus on how geographic distance (which is the only 
factor affecting the probability of tax officers’ visiting high information areas) affects 
the information acquired by tax officers. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the baseline regressions designed to test the empirical 
relationship between distance and tax avoidance. I first estimate Model (1) using ETR 
and METR as the dependent variable. I observe a negative and significant coefficient 
estimate for Distance, suggesting that firms located closer to the tax office report 
higher tax liabilities on their returns.  
The results shown in Panel A of Table 3 are economically meaningful. For example, 
using the coefficient estimate of -0.441 (-0.639) in Panel A, column (1) (column (2)), 
a one standard deviation increase in distance is associated with a reduction of 2.86 
(4.15) percentage points in ETR (METR), explaining 14.7 percent (21.8 percent) of the 
total effective tax rate.  
4.1.2 Metric for the Sphere of Human Activity  
To understand the strength of the proximity effect at different distance levels, I split 
the full sample into firms with different distances to the tax office. Specifically, I use 
2 km, 3 km, 4 km, 5 km, 10 km, and so on until 30 km as the cut-off points and run 
Model (1) separately using each subsample. To save space, I only present selected 
results here. The results are presented in Panel B. I find that the magnitude of the 
coefficient on Distance is monotonically reduced from the 2 km subsample to the 12 
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km subsample, suggesting that the effect of proximity is stronger for firms located 
closer to the tax office, and that geographical distance has a diminishing effect on tax 
avoidance. To confirm my findings, I perform the Chow test to determine whether 
Distance has the same marginal effect on tax avoidance in different distance ranges, 
and perform Vuong (1989) tests to examine the change of R2 attributable to the 
inclusion of Distance. The untabulated results indicate that i) the marginal effect of 
Distance is larger when the distance is smaller than 2 km than when the distance is 
smaller than 3 km, 4 km, 5 km …12 km (for brevity, I only report the results when the 
distance is smaller than 2 km, 4 km, 5 km, and 10 km), and ii) when the distance is 
shorter than 2 km, Distance has the greatest incremental ability to explain ETR.20 
These results suggest that the marginal effect of distance is stronger and community 
information is denser for firms located closer to the tax office. The implication of this 
result is that the distribution of community information at the firm’s location is not 
strictly linear.21 
---insert Table 3--- 
The sign and significance of the control variable coefficients are generally 
consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Lin et al. 2017). Specifically, higher ETRs are 
associated with higher levels of profitability, firm age, and intangible assets; with firms 
located in regions with more developed economies and less mature institutional 
environments; and with firms reporting lower levels of net income and discretionary 
accruals. 
Alternatively, I estimate the baseline model by including dummy variables that 
                                            
20 The untabulated results also suggest that effDistance is negative and significant for the baseline regression 
using ETR and METR as the dependent variables. I also conduct falsification tests of the baseline regressions 
between distance and ETR. I fit the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th order polynomial regressions. Relative to the linear 
polynomial specification, a likelihood ratio test rejects the specification in which a higher order polynomial is 
fitted (p-value 0.05). Therefore, the relation between distance and tax avoidance is linear. 
21 I tried to use the standard forms of quadratic, cubic, fourth and fifth order polynomial to fit the data but the 
results show that the data does not fit those standard non-linear functions well. 
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indicate the stepwise distance between firm headquarters and tax office. Specifically, 
I create Dummy2, Dummy3, Dummy4, and Dummy5, which equal 1 if the distance 
between the firm headquarters and tax office is smaller than 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 
km, respectively. Otherwise, the variables are coded as 0. The results are reported in 
Table 4. I find that Dummy2 is significantly positively related to ETR, and that the 
coefficients of Dummy3, Dummy4, and Dummy5 are not significant. These findings 
indicate that the information available within the 2 km sphere is significantly greater 
than the information available beyond it.   
---insert Table 4--- 
4.1.3 Baseline Relationship between Travel Costs and Tax Avoidance 
Table 5 provides the results of the baseline regressions using travel costs as the 
independent variables. The results show that travel time and travel distance by car, 
bicycle and foot are significantly and negatively related to ETR. The results are similar 
when METR is used as the dependent variable. 
---insert Table 5--- 
In China, county-level tax offices do not collect income taxes from central 
government owned enterprises or from firms established after 2002. The new 
enterprise income tax took effect in 2008. After rerunning the baseline regressions on 
the samples excluding central government–owned firms, firms established after 2002, 
and firm-years in 2007, I find similar results. 
4.2. Effects of Geographic Distance and Social Networks 
4.2.1 Baseline Regressions on the Relationship between Social Connections and the 
Distance Effect 
Table 6 provides the results of the baseline regression on the impact of social networks 
on the geographic distance effect. Again, ETR and METR are defined to be decreasing 
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in corporate tax avoidance. The coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, consistent with expectations. 
The negative estimated coefficients r suggest that social connectedness of tax officers 
and firms enhances the distance effect on tax avoidance. As a result, when a firm is 
near a tax office, tax officers are more likely to visit the firm’s location for community 
information when the firm is more socially connected, and therefore the firm engages 
in less tax avoidance. It follows that the impact of distance on tax avoidance will 
intensify when firms have more social connections.  
The results shown in Table 6 suggest that the distance effect on tax avoidance is 
even stronger for firms that have been established for longer, listed for longer, and 
located in the community for longer, as well as for state-owned firms, and in particular 
for local state-owned firms. I conduct an F-test and find that the joint effects are 
statistically significant across the columns.  
---insert Table 6--- 
Table 7 presents the baseline results for the impact of social networks on the 
geographic distance effect, using Close as the independent variable. The results 
suggest that when tax officers and firms are less socially connected, the coefficient on 
the Distance term is negative and statistically insignificant; when they are more 
connected, nearby firms pay more taxes than faraway firms. The untabulated results 
also suggest that the relationship between travel costs and tax avoidance is even 
stronger for firms that are more socially connected. The results are similar when METR 
is used as the dependent variable. Overall, the results indicate that social connectedness 
is an important moderator of the distance effect. The results support my argument that 
social interaction is a mechanism through which regulators can obtain community 
information. 
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---insert Table 7--- 
4.2.2 Sensitivity Tests, Robustness Checks, and Additional Tests 
Table 8 presents a battery of sensitivity tests and robustness checks for the baselines 
presented above. I evaluate the sensitivity of my main results to different definitions 
of my dependent variables. For brevity, I report the main results in Panel A of Table 8. 
I estimate Total ETR using the ratio of the sum of total tax expenses to pre-tax income. 
I estimate three-year book ETR (3-year ETR) using the ratio of the three-year sum of 
income tax expense to the three-year sum of pre-tax income in years t, t+1, and t+2. 
Using 3-year ETR avoids significant year-to-year variation in the annual effective tax 
rate (Dryreng et al. 2008) and reflects the likelihood that the tax bureau may audit 
additional years if it discovers underreporting in a certain year. I similarly estimate a 
3-year Cash ETR.22 My results are not sensitive to these alternative tax avoidance 
measures. Panel B of Table 8 shows that my results are also robust to the inclusion of 
additional city-level macroeconomic and fiscal variables, such as Population Density, 
GDP, Fiscal income, and Fiscal expenditure.  
---insert Table 8--- 
In addition to soft information within the community network, I focus on variation in 
accounting information on firms to examine whether hard information weakens the 
geographic distance effect on corporate tax avoidance. I proxy the level of hard 
information separately using four variables (Analyst coverage by reports, Analyst 
coverage, Big 4 auditor, and Analyst forecast errors), and interact them with the 
distance variable in Model (1). Although I find stronger results for the distance effects, 
I treat these findings as supplementary (presented in Table 9), because they are 
                                            
22 As Chinese firms do not disclose cash income tax payment information, I estimate this amount by taking total tax expenses 
plus beginning taxes payable minus ending taxes payable, following Bradshaw et al. (2018). 
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statistically weak. 
---insert Table 9--- 
4.3. The Influence of Functional Distance on the Geographic Distance Effect 
4.3.1 Univariate Tests 
Table 10 presents univariate tests on dark and bright firms. To provide univariate tests 
of my hypothesis, I partition the sample into dark and bright samples. (Bright firm-
years indicate that the firm is brighter than the tax office, and darker otherwise.) Panel 
A of Table 10 shows that dark and bright firms are dispersed across regions with 
different levels of tax avoidance. Panel B of Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics 
and univariate test results for the control variables of dark firms and bright firms. Dark 
firms report significantly larger intangibility (INTAN) and firm age (Age), and smaller 
capital intensity (CI). The differences in firm attributes between the two groups suggest 
the need for multivariate analysis. 
---insert Table 10--- 
4.3.2 Multivariate Tests of the Relationship between Functional Distance and 
Distance Effect 
First, I run Model (1) using the two distance variables (Distance and Close) and Bright 
as my independent variables (columns (1)-(3) of Table 11). Bright firms engage in less 
tax avoidance than dark firms. I then interact Bright with Distance in column (4). I 
focus on the enhancing effect of Bright on distance variables (not the enhancing effect 
of the distance variable on Bright), so I focus on the shift in the distance variable 
coefficient from dark (= α2) to bright (= α2 + α3). I consider Distance × Bright as a 
joint product of the actual distance in km and the dummy of brightness (1 = firm is 
located on the bright side of the tax office, 0 otherwise), so that Distance = 0 until it 
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reaches firms located on the bright side. The results suggest that the distance effect on 
tax avoidance is even stronger when firms are located in dark areas.  
I next estimate Model (2) in column (5). The coefficient on Bright (α1) measures the 
effect of nighttime illumination when it is Far. The coefficient on Close (α2) measures 
the effect of distance when it is dark. The interaction term Close × Bright (α3) measures 
the shift in the Close coefficient from dark to bright firms (i.e., α2 + α3 – α2 = α3), or 
measures the shift in the Bright coefficient from far to close firms (i.e., α1 + α3 – α1 = 
α3). The positive α3 indicates that firms that are lighter than the tax office (i.e., Bright 
= 1) enhance the distance effect compared with those that are darker (i.e., Bright = 0). 
In other words, when it is dark, distance has no effect; when it becomes bright, nearby 
firms pay more taxes than faraway firms.  
I conduct an F-test to determine whether Bright and distance variables are jointly 
significant, and present a matrix to illustrate changes in distance effect over time for 
dark versus bright firms in columns (4) and (5) of Table 11. The second column of the 
matrix shows that the distance effect is enhanced for firms that evolve from dark to 
light.  
---insert Table 11--- 
4.4. The Effect of Functional Distance and Mall Openings  
4.4.1 Univariate Tests 
To provide univariate tests of H4 in Table 12, I partition the sample into treatment and 
control groups. I define the 4,292 firms located within counties where new malls have 
opened as my treatment group. I exclude firm-years affected by more than one mall 
opening in the same county. I compare the mean ETR of the two groups of firms. I 
consider only within-county variation in Mall when reporting ETR. As there is little 
macroeconomic variation within a county, the mall opening effect is unlikely to be 
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driven by other macroeconomic changes that also affect tax avoidance. The mall 
opening effect changes the functional distance between firm and tax office, but does 
not affect the geographic distance between the two. 
 Panel A of Table 13 shows that the treatment and control groups do not explain the 
variation in effective tax rates. Panel B of Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics and 
univariate test results for the control variables. The treated firms report significantly 
larger capital intensity (CI), firm age (Age), and government ownership (Ownership). 
They also report significantly lower total market capitalization (Size), net operating 
loss (NOL), number of employees (Employee), and profitability standard deviation (SD 
ROA). The differences in firm attributes between the two groups suggest the need for 
multivariate analysis. 
---insert Table 12--- 
4.4.2 Multivariate Tests of the Baseline Regression between Shopping Mall 
Openings and Tax Avoidance for Firms Located Near to (Far from) Malls 
The results in Table 13 show that the effect of shopping malls on tax avoidance follows 
different trends for different geographic distances between firms and malls. To 
evaluate the distribution of the influence of mall openings on tax avoidance, I run 
Model (3) for different subgroups: firms located within 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 km 
of the malls, and firms located at least 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 km away from the 
malls. I find that the coefficients of Mall are negative and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level if the firms are located at least 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, or 5 km away from 
the malls. However, the coefficients of Mall are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level if the firms are located within 2 km of the malls, at the 5 percent 
level if the firms are located within 3 km of the malls, and at the 1 percent level if firms 
are located within 4 km of the malls. The coefficients of Mall are insignificant if the 
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firms are located within 5 km of the malls. The magnitudes of the coefficients decrease 
as the distance between the firms and new malls increases. Specifically, the results in 
Panel A, column (3) (column (4)) of Table 13 show the impact of mall openings on 
ETR if the firms are located at least 3 km away from (within 3 km of) the malls. Mean 
ETR shows a significant 2.0 percent increase (1.8 percent decrease) after the opening 
of the new shopping malls.  
The effects of Mall are significantly positive when the malls are located within 2 
km, 3 km, and 4 km of the firms. However, its effects are significantly negative when 
the malls are located at least 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 km from the firms. These results 
are consistent with H4. Both the magnitude and the significance of Mall decrease when 
the distance between mall and firm increases from 2 km to 5 km. The differences 
between the coefficients are statistically significant. This indicates the diminishing 
influence of the close proximity of mall and firm on the effects of Mall. The within-
country differences between the effects of Mall suggest that tax avoidance is not 
affected by local activities. 
Overall, the results suggest that the opening of shopping malls increases (reduces) 
the likelihood of tax officers’ gaining access to community information at a firm’s 
location, and as a result increases (decreases) the firm’s level of tax avoidance.  
---insert Table 13--- 
To provide further evidence that the effect of community information is 
concentrated at the firm’s location, I run the baseline regression model on the effect of 
mall openings on tax avoidance for different distances between the malls and tax 
offices. Similarly, I partition the sample into different subgroups: firms located within 
2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 km of the tax offices, and firms located at least 2 km, 3 km, 
4 km, and 5 km away from the tax offices. The untabulated results show that the 
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coefficients of Mall are mixed between the subgroups. My findings are different from 
those of Kubick et al. (2017), who use geographic distance to capture the level of 
information asymmetry between tax officers and firms, They find that firms located 
far away from tax offices engage in more tax avoidance, suggesting that information 
is geographically concentrated around the tax offices. The main results are similar if I 
replace the event year with one year preceding the mall opening and exclude firms 
established after 2002 (which do not pay enterprise income tax to local tax bureaus) 
and firm-years in 2007 (the year before the new enterprise income tax took effect).   
Next, I provide evidence that the effect of mall openings is not influenced by the 
opening of other shopping malls in the same counties, or by firms’ change of address. 
I hand-collected data on malls that have a similar impact in the count and were opened 
during the sample period, and adopt the earliest time if there were multiple other malls 
built in that county. Furthermore, I hand-collected data on changes in firm addresses 
during the sample period. I exclude firm-year observations in counties where other 
shopping malls have been opened and when firms have changed their address within 
four years before and after the opening of new malls. Next, I run the baseline regression 
on the effect of mall openings on tax avoidance and obtain results similar to the main 
findings. This suggests that my findings are qualitatively and quantitatively invariant. 
The results are not included for brevity.   
---insert Table 13--- 
Table 14 provides further evidence that corporate tax avoidance exhibits consistent 
patterns before the malls open. To evaluate this, I define three false openings: “one 
year prior to mall opening” (k = -1), which equals 1 the year before the mall opening; 
“two years prior to mall opening” (k = -2), which equals 1 two years before the mall 
opening; and “three years prior to mall opening” (k = -3), which equals 1 three years 
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before the mall opening. I then include these variables in the estimation and capture 
pre-exit trends. I find that the coefficients of Mall are positive and statistically 
insignificant in columns (1) and (2), and negative and statistically insignificant in 
column (3). The untabulated results are similar for the samples excluding firms 
established after 2002, firm-year observations in counties where other malls were built, 
and firms that changed address. Most importantly, my main findings are qualitatively 
and quantitatively invariant.   
---insert Table 14--- 
Table 15 provides further evidence that the effect of mall openings on tax avoidance 
does not exhibit different trends if other local activities influence firm behaviors. To 
evaluate this possibility, I define false openings of county-level offices and conduct 
falsification tests of the effect of office building openings. Office buildings and 
shopping malls should reflect a similar degree of macroeconomic development. Both 
office and mall opening are associated with a high level of urban development, which 
in turn associated with an increased economic and social activities. While mall opening 
creates an activity space that attracts people in a community to engage in some daily 
activities there (such as enjoying meals, social gathering, enjoying movies), office 
building do not offer a “common activity space” that is publicly accessible. As a result, 
tax officer is unlikely to go to the office building to engage in daily activities. Therefore, 
the crucial difference between mall opening and office opening is that office building 
openings do not change the functional distance between tax office and firms, or the 
probability that tax officers will visit the firm location for information. On the other 
hand, shopping mall openings will affect the functional distance between firms and tax 
office, because it will increase or decrease the probability for tax officers to visit and 
interact with each other at firms’ location. I hand-collected the addresses and years of 
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opening of office buildings in all of the sampled counties during the sample period.23 
I restrict the sample of office building to the size with the height of the treated office 
buildings being taller or equal to 150 meters. 7,082 firm-year observations, 1,059 firms, 
100 counties are affected by the effect of office building opening. I exclude office 
buildings that opened in the same year as a shopping mall in that county to ensure that 
the effect of mall openings does not overlap with the effect of office building openings. 
The Office variable takes a value of 1 for firm-year observations in counties where a 
new office building has been built, and 0 otherwise. I then include it in the estimation 
to capture the effect of new office buildings on corporate tax avoidance. I find that the 
coefficient of Office is statistically insignificant, consistent with expectations. Even 
more importantly, the results suggest that office building openings have no impact on 
corporate tax avoidance. My main findings regarding the effect of mall openings are 
qualitative and quantitatively exogenous and invariant.  
---insert Table 15--- 
To test H5, I examine the impact of variation in the number of parking spaces on 
the effect of mall openings on tax avoidance. Specifically, I run Model (3) for two 
subgroups: firms located in areas with shopping malls that have more parking spaces 
than the sample median; and firms located in areas with shopping malls that have fewer 
parking spaces than the sample median. I use the number of parking spaces to capture 
the size of the mall. I expect a larger shopping mall to offer more attractions for tax 
officers, making them more likely to visit such a mall. As a result, the effects of mall 
openings will be stronger. The results are reported in Table 16. As expected, the results 
suggest that the effect of mall openings is stronger for firms affected by malls with 
                                            
23 I hand-collected all of the addresses and opening years for the office buildings listed in 100 Tallest Completed Buildings in 
the World at http://www.skyscrapercenter.com/. 
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more parking spaces. 
---insert Table 16--- 
4.5 Additional Analysis 
4.5.1. Subsamples on the Influence of Geographic Distance on the Mall Opening 
Effect 
In this subsample analysis, I examine the effect of geographic distance between firms 
and tax offices on the mall opening effect. I expect this variable to be an important 
mediator of the mall opening effect, because it will affect the amount of community 
information that tax officers obtain even in the absence of a mall opening. As a result, 
it affects the incremental/marginal effect of a mall opening on the amount of 
information a tax officer will gain/lose due to a mall opening. Specifically, if a firm is 
located very close to a tax office, tax officers will have more information about the 
firm with or without a mall opening, so the marginal effect will be lower. Specifically, 
I run Model (3) after defining a dummy variable, Close, which equals 1 if the distance 
between the tax office and the firm is shorter than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
The results are presented in Table 17. They suggest that the effect of mall openings is 
stronger if firms are located far away from tax offices, which is consistent with my 
expectation. 
---insert Table 17--- 
4.5.2. Subsamples on the Influence of Social Networks on the Mall Opening Effect 
In this subsample analysis, I examine how social networks between tax officers and 
firms influence the mall opening effect. Specifically, I run Model (3) for two subgroups, 
local SOEs and non-local SOEs, and present the results in Table 18. They suggest that 
the effect of new malls is stronger for local SOEs if the malls are located close to firms, 
and stronger for non-local SOEs if the malls are located far away from firms. These 
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results make sense: social connectedness enhances the ability of tax officers to access 
community information when firms and malls are close. This echoes my previous 
analysis of how social connectedness enhances the distance effect. Tax officers can 
still maintain social networks with SOEs even when they are less likely to visit the 
firm location after the mall has been opened. However, they do not have network 
connections with non-SOEs. As a result, non-SOEs will engage in more tax avoidance 
than SOEs after a mall opening. Similar results are presented in Table 19, which shows 
the effect of firm age on the relationship between mall openings and tax avoidance.  
---insert Table 18--- 
---insert Table 19--- 
4.5.3. Subsamples on the Influence of County-Level Population Density on the Mall 
Opening Effect 
In this section, I examine how variation in county-level population density moderates 
the effect of mall openings on tax avoidance. Specifically, I run Model (3) for two 
subgroups—firms that are in counties with a population density higher than the sample 
median, and firms that are in counties with a population density lower than the sample 
median—and present the results in Table 20. The results suggest that the effect of mall 
openings is stronger for firms in low population density counties if they are located far 
away from malls. The implication of these results is that tax officers are less likely to 
visit a firm’s location and obtain community information if the firm is located in a area 
with a low population density and far away from malls.  
---insert Table 20--- 
4.5.4. Subsamples on the Influence of Nighttime Illumination on the Mall Opening 
Effect 
In this subsample analysis, I examine the influence of the level of economic and social 
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activity on the mall opening effect. I expect the level of economic and social activity 
to moderate the mall opening effect, because it will affect the amount of community 
information that tax officers obtain even in the absence of a mall opening. As a result, 
it affects the incremental/marginal effect of mall openings on the amount of 
information a tax officer will gain/lose due to mall openings. Specifically, if a firm’s 
location has greater nighttime illumination, tax officers will have more information 
about the firm with or without mall openings, so the marginal effect will be lower. 
Specifically, I run Model (3) for two subgroups—firms in areas with greater nighttime 
illumination than the sample median and firms in areas with less nighttime illumination 
than the sample median—and present the result in Table 21. The sample period is from 
2007 to 2013. The results suggest that the effect of mall openings is stronger if firms 
are located in low nighttime illumination areas. The results reported in Table 21 
indicate that in the subsample of firms located near a new mall, the coefficients on the 
Mall variable are all negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
consistent with expectations.  
---insert Table 21--- 
4.5.5. Subsamples on the Influence of Geometric Angle on the Mall Opening Effect  
In this subsample analysis, I examine how the probability that tax officers will pass by 
a firm when they are traveling to a mall will affect tax avoidance by affecting the 
amount of community information tax officers possess. I capture the level of functional 
distance by the geometric angle of the tax office between the location of a firm and the 
location of the mall. Given the same distance, a smaller angle means that it is more 
likely that a tax officer will pass by the firm’s location when traveling to the mall.  
In turn, this probability affects the amount of information a tax officer will gain/lose. 
Specifically, if tax officers are unlikely to pass by the firm while traveling to the new 
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mall, they will have less information about the firm due to the mall opening and the 
marginal effect will be higher. Specifically, I define the geometric angle of the tax 
office in relation to the firm and mall by calculating the cosine on the distance between 
the mall and firm, mall and tax office, and firm and tax office. I run Model (3) for two 
subgroups: firms in which the angle of the tax office toward the firm and mall is less 
than 90 degrees, and firms in which the angle of the tax office toward the firm and 
mall is larger than or equal to 90 degrees. I present the results in Panel A of Table 22. 
The results indicate that the coefficients on Mall are all negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for the large angle group, using ETR as the dependent 
variable. The coefficients on Mall are statistically insignificant for the small angle 
group, consistent with expectations. 
These results imply that if the angle toward the firm and mall is larger than 90 
degrees, there is a lower probability that tax collectors will visit the firm’s location for 
information when they go to malls, leading the firm to engage in more tax avoidance. 
The results suggest that tax officers in large angle groups are diverted after a shopping 
mall has opened.  
Panel B of Table 22 provides further evidence that corporate tax avoidance does not 
exhibit different trends before the opening of new shopping malls. To evaluate this 
possibility, I define three false openings. “One year prior to mall opening” (k = -1) 
equals 1 in the year before the opening; “two years prior to mall opening” (k = -2) 
equals 1 two years before the opening; and “three years prior to mall opening” (k = -
3) equals 1 three years before the opening. I then include these in the estimation of the 
large angle sample and capture pre-exit trends. I find that the coefficients of Mall are 
negative and statistically insignificant for one, two, and three years prior to the mall 
opening, using ETR as the dependent variable. Most importantly, my findings are 
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qualitatively and quantitatively invariant.  
---insert Table 22--- 
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5. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Using a unique setting in China in which tax offices are located very close to publicly 
listed firms, my study examines whether tax officers can obtain community 
information from their daily activities that can mitigate corporate tax avoidance. I first 
capture the likelihood that tax officers will obtain firm information from the 
community by using the physical distance between firms and tax offices. I demonstrate 
that there is a positive relationship between the geographic distance between tax 
officers and firms and tax avoidance. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
tax officers can obtain information from being geographically very close to firms. The 
marginal effects of distance are stronger if firms are located closer to tax officers. I 
also find that the distance effect is more pronounced if firms and tax officers are more 
socially connected. I further examine the joint effect of geographic proximity and 
functional distance on tax avoidance. I find that the distance effect is strengthened for 
firms with a smaller functional distance to tax offices.  
I use the opening of shopping malls as a testing ground to further examine how a 
change in functional distance between tax office and firms can affect tax avoidance. 
The opening of a shopping mall within a community tends to attract tax officers to the 
area in which the mall is located. This tends to decrease the functional distance 
between tax offices and firms close to the shopping mall, but increase the functional 
distance for firms located far away from the mall. As a result, tax officers tend to have 
more information about firms located close to the shopping mall and less information 
about firms located far away from the shopping mall. Consistent with my expectation, 
I find that firms engage in less tax avoidance if the shopping mall is located within 3 
km of the firm, but engage in more tax avoidance if the shopping mall is located 3 km 
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or more away. In addition, the effect of shopping malls is moderated by local SOE, 
county population density, firm area nighttime illumination, number of parking spaces 
at the shopping mall, and geographic distance between the tax office and firm.  
Overall, my results offer evidence that tax-relevant information is available at the 
community level, and that the availability of this information to tax authorities can 
affect tax avoidance behaviors. My research contributes to the literature on corporate 
tax avoidance by identifying community information as a new determinant of tax 
avoidance. It also contributes to the literature on community information by showing 
that this kind of information can influence the monitoring effectiveness of regulators. 
My study contributes to this body of research by creating two innovative measures of 
the concept of functional distance. In addition to its academic value, my study has 
important policy implications. In particular, it suggests that a decentralized tax 
collection system has an informational advantage, as it can facilitate the acquisition of 
community information by tax authorities.  
Although my study offers strong evidence for the effects of commuity information 
on tax avoidance, it still has several limitations that call for further research. . For 
example, tax offices reallocation can be a good activities/events setting to address the 
change of functional distance. But I can only identify around 30 cases of tax office 
reallocations (involving around 50 treated firms) during my sample period. As a result, 
it is difficult to conduct the difference-in-difference tests using the reallocation data. I 
suggest using this setting for future research when sufficient data becomes available.  
In addition to the social interactions between firms and tax officers, whether 
interactions between tax payers affect tax avoidance is a worthy topic of investigation. 
In response to tax audits, for example, firms that are closer to each other engage in 
more social interactions regarding their tax strategies, enabling them to learn from each 
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other, which in turn influences tax avoidance.   
My study focuses on information collected in daily life activities. I also show that 
how social connectedness of firms can influence the distance effects. Further studies 
could use other measures or determinants of social connectedness, e.g., social, medical, 
educational development. It is also a good idea to have the number of restaurants/tea 
houses in the new mall to justify the presence of interactions and observational 
learning in those new malls. However, historical data on the number of restaurants/tea 
houses are not available. I also collected the data of Metro line opening during the 
sample period, but the number of data is very few. In addition to whether the social 
interactions between firms and tax officers, whether interactions among taxpayers can 
affect tax avoidance are worthwhile for future investigation. For example, firms can 
learn from each other through social interactions on their tax strategies in response to 
tax audits if firms are close to each other, which influence tax avoidance. 
 
In addition, further studies could examine whether audit-relevant and banking-
relevant information is also available at the community level, and whether the 
availability of this information to auditors and banks mitigates information asymmetry 
and consequently affects the quality of financial statements and mitigates loan defaults. 
My study examines how the availability of community information to tax authorities 
can influence tax avoidance; future research could examine how the availability of 
community information to other regulators can affect other forms of corporate 
misconduct, such as securities fraud and insider trading.  
In addition, researchers could examine whether the internal design of a firm 
influences the amount of firm information available at the community level. For 
instance, if a firm has its own canteen, employees are less likely to have meals and 
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coffee outside the firm. Therefore, internal corporate information is less likely to be 
delivered to the external community.  
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Appendix A. Sources 
Source Computation Mean 
Meas
ure  
Local 
bound
ary 
Covel, Moskowitz 
(2001) 
Distance between fund 
manager and corporate 
headquarters 
N/A km 100 
Covel, Moskowitz 
(2002) 
Distance between fund 
manager and corporate 
headquarters 
1654-1734 km N/A 
Kubick et al. 
(2017) 
Distance between corporate 
headquarters and the nearest 
IRS territory manager 
53.949 mile N/A 
Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005) 
Distance between investor and 
corporate headquarters 
917 mile 250 
Ragozzino and 
Reuer (2009) 
Distance between the 
headquarters of the acquiring 
and targeting firms 
800-1381 mile N/A 
Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010) 
Driving distance between 
firms and bank branches  
9.91-10.67 mile N/A 
Ghoul et al. (2013) 
Distance in kilometers from 
firms’ headquarters to the 
nearest city center of the six 
financial centers 
499.214 km 100 
Nguyen and 
Nguyen (2017) 
Distance between a 
company’s headquarters and 
all SEC offices. 
184.82 km 300 
Malloy (2005) 
Distance between firm 
headquarters and analyst 
1510-1516 km 100 
Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) 
Distance to SEC is the 
distance between the county 
where firms are headquartered 
and the closest SEC office, 
defined as the closer of the 
headquarters in Washington, 
DC or the closest regional 
SEC office.  
333-3930 km 100 
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Appendix B. Case studies 
Case study 1  
In 2014, the tax officers at the 7th branch of the Local Taxation Bureau in Wuxi City, 
Jiangsu Province got a tip as the result of a casual conversation, and collected more 
than 300,000 RMB in back taxes from a cotton textile enterprise.  
In a regular check, the branch recently found that a cotton textile manufacturing 
enterprise reported a substantial increase in fixed assets in proportion to sales revenue, 
much higher than the industry level. Tax officers inquired about the firm and was told 
that the firm had purchased a piece of automated production equipment in the previous 
year, but the cotton textile market was not good, and sales had dropped sharply. 
Inspectors confirmed this situation through a visit to the cotton market and an 
inspection of the enterprise’s site. In conversation, the manager told the tax officials 
that the new equipment performed well and required ten fewer workers per workshop. 
The tax officer became curious about whether the number of employees declared in 
income tax had decreased. He checked records at the tax bureau and found that there 
had been no change in the number of employees declared by the enterprise. 
Consequently, the tax official deduced that the firm was misreporting the number of 
employees and salaries paid.  
In a field inspection, the tax official found that 30 workers reported in income tax 
returns did not return to work after the spring festival. By investigating the firm’s cash 
flows, the tax official found that although the firm had transferred the salaries of these 
workers to the corresponding personnel’s bank accounts, the money was transferred 
back on the same day to the account of Mr. Lee, the firm’s financial manager. 
Facing this evidence, the manager had to confess that the firm was avoiding taxes 
by misreporting staff salaries and instead rewarding the top management. In the end, 
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the firm was forced to repay enterprise income tax of 206,000 RMB and personal 
income tax of 152,000 yuan, in addition to late fees.24 
Case study 2 
In 2009, a tax official in Hunan Province, Shuangpai County followed up on a whistle 
blower’s report, which led to a settlement in a tax avoidance case. The tax bureau 
collected 41,800 RMB in back taxes and late fees. 
The tax official Mr. He was chatting with his friends when one of them suddenly 
said, “There’s an auto repair shop that hasn’t paid tax for seven months, do you know 
about it?” Mr. He pumped him about the case. However, the friend refused to disclose 
anything more. It was obvious that the friend had inside information.  
To dispel his friend’s concerns, Mr. He had dinner with him, set out the policy of 
rewards for reporting, and promised to keep the information confidential. The friend 
finally told him the truth.  
A particular firm had made an agreement with its employee, Mr. Deng, promising 
to give his auto repair business all of its work. Mr. Deng had been doing auto repairs 
for seven months and received the fees accordingly. However, he had never paid taxes 
on the sales revenue. After inspecting the financial statements, tax officials found that 
the sales revenue of the auto repair business had never been reflected in the financial 
statements and taxes declared to the tax bureau. Moreover, the firm had never 
registered for a tax certificate at the tax bureau.  
Based on the information obtained, the Shuangpai county tax bureau immediately 
decided to open an investigation and collect evidence from the firm. Tax officials found 
that since January, the firm had engaged in 28 sales transactions with the auto repair 
company and failed to report 127,800 RMB. Based on this evidence, tax officials asked 
                                            
24 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_c34186990102v1qc.html 
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Mr. Deng to furnish the financial statements of the auto repair company. They found 
that the company had obtained 348,400 RMB in tax-free repair income and failed to 
pay 19,900 RMB in taxes from January to July.  
Under the Tax Administration Law, Shuangpai county tax bureau collected 20,900 
RMB in back taxes and imposed a double tax fine on the firm. The bureau also gave 
the informer a reward of 500 RMB for his tip.25 
  
                                            
25 http://www.233.com/Accountant/615/20090721/113642294.html 
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Appendix C Variable definitions  
 
This table presents the variable definitions for the sample firms. It defines all of the 
variables used in my analyses.  
Variable Source Definition 
Distance variables: 
Distance 
Manual 
collection 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus kilometers 
to the county tax office. 
Close 
Manual 
collection 
Equal to 1 if distance is less than 
sample median, 0 otherwise. 
Bright  DMSP-OLS 
Equal to 1 if firm is lighter than tax 
office, 0 otherwise. 
ETR variables:   
ETR CSMAR 
Income tax expenses divided by pre-
tax book income. 
METR 
CSMAR and Wu 
et al. (2012) 
Income tax expenses divided by 
adjusted taxable income. 
Control variables: 
ROA CSMAR Profits divided by total assets. 
SD_ROA CSMAR 
Standard deviation of ROA by 3 
years. 
Leverage CSMAR Total debt divided by total assets. 
SIZE CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. 
Employee CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of total number of 
employees. 
INTAN CSMAR 
Intangible assets divided by total 
assets. 
PPE CSMAR 
Investment in the sum of gross 
property, plant, and equipment 
divided by total assets. 
FCF CSMAR Free cash flow divided by total assets.  
NOL CSMAR 
Equal to 1 if the firm reports a 
positive net operating loss 
carryforward during the year, 0 
otherwise. 
CI CSMAR 
Net fixed assets divided by total 
assets. 
Age CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the number of 
years since establishment. 
SOE CSMAR 
Equal to 1 if the controlling stock 
owner of a listed firm is the state, and 
0 otherwise. 
SOE local CSMAR 
Equal to 1 if the controlling stock 
owner of a listed firm is the local city 
or municipal government, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Coverage report CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the average 
monthly number of earnings forecasts 
per firm per year. 
Coverage analyst CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the average 
number of analysts who issued 
earnings forecasts per firm per year. 
BIG4 auditor CSMAR 
Equal to 1 if a listed firm hires a Big 4 
auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Macroeconomic variables: 
City-level GDP CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the city-level 
gross domestic product. 
City-level fiscal 
expenditure 
CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the city-level 
fiscal expenditure. 
City-level fiscal 
income 
CSMAR 
Natural logarithm of the city-level 
fiscal income. 
Population density 
National Census 
and manual 
collection 
Natural logarithm of the residential 
population size divided by the county 
area (km2). 
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LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS 
Table 1 Sample selection      
This table presents the sample selection procedure for firms listed on the Chinese A-
share market during the 10-year sample period between 2007 and 2016. 
    No. of firm-year observations 
1. Non-financial A-share population 23,328   
Excluding:       
2. Firms with missing distance data  (5,285)   
3. Firms with zero ETRs  (1,919)   
Final pooled sample   16,124   
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. The sample consists 
of 16,124 firm-year observations for 2295 non-financial firms over the 9-year period 
from 2007 to 2016. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 N mean sd Min p25 p50 p75 max 
ETR 16,124 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.70 
METR 14,841 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.71 
Distance 16,124 6.62 6.49 0.42 2.38 4.70 8.11 37.04 
ROA 16,124 0.05 0.05 -0.22 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.21 
SD_ROA 16,124 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.30 
Size 16,124 15.64 1.07 12.69 14.89 15.53 16.20 18.92 
INTAN 
16,124 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.35 
PPE 16,124 0.42 0.22 0.00 0.25 0.40 0.57 0.92 
Leverage 
16,124 0.42 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.42 0.59 1.07 
TobinQ 16,124 3.13 11.53 0.60 1.50 2.21 3.51 12.48 
FCF 16,124 0.02 0.05 -0.27 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.19 
Capital 
intensity 
16,124 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.74 
Age 16,124 1.94 0.92 0.00 1.39 2.08 2.71 3.18 
SOE 16,124 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Employee 
16,124 7.62 1.34 3.50 6.76 7.56 8.43 11.37 
NOL 16,124 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3 Baseline regressions on the effect of geographic distance on corporate 
tax avoidance 
This table reports the results of baseline regressions designed to test the effect of 
distance on corporate tax avoidance. I define Distance as the natural logarithm of 1 
plus the distance between the firm and tax office. Variable definitions can be found 
in Appendix C. All of the regressions include county and industry year fixed effects. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample  
Dependent 
variable  ETR  METR 
 [1]  [2] 
Distance -0.441**  -0.639*** 
 (-2.161)  (-2.642) 
ROA -11.930  -30.285** 
 (-1.037)  (-2.252) 
SIZE -0.956***  -0.562** 
 (-5.177)  (-2.411) 
INTAN 7.220***  -3.939 
 (2.747)  (-1.186) 
PPE -6.598***  3.754*** 
 (-6.565)  (2.799) 
Leverage 8.073***  4.656* 
 (4.206)  (1.955) 
FCF -10.869  -4.452 
 (-0.949)  (-0.335) 
NOL 0.890*  0.208 
 (1.912)  (0.307) 
Capital Intensity 1.281  -8.557*** 
 (0.938)  (-5.301) 
Age 1.556***  2.198*** 
 (10.234)  (11.721) 
SD_ROA -11.643***  -3.884 
 (-2.741)  (-0.742) 
Employee 0.468***  0.026 
 (3.488)  (0.158) 
SOE 0.129  0.977** 
 (0.396)  (2.250) 
Industry×Year FE Yes  yes 
County FE Yes  yes 
Adj. R squared 0.221  0.256 
Observations 16,124  14,827 
Panel B: Subsamples 
Distance <2 km <4 km <5 km <10 km <12 km 
Dependent variable              ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Distance -5.433*** -1.679*** -1.185** -0.783** -0.484 
 (-3.600) (-2.603) (-2.298) (-2.221) (-1.490) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
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IndustryYear FE yes yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R squared 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.25 
Observations 3,250 6,977 8,489 13,118 13,831 
Chow test      
[1]-[2] 0.03     
[1]-[3] 0.03     
[3]-[4] 0.02     
 
72 
 
Table 4 Baseline regressions on the effect of geographic distance on corporate 
tax avoidance 
This table reports the results of baseline dummy variable regressions that are 
designed for testing the non-linear relation between geographic distance and 
corporate tax avoidance. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. All 
regressions include year, industry, and industry year fixed effects. The p values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard error clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable ETR  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Dummy2 0.743**    
 (2.126)    
Dummy3  0.333   
  (1.108)   
Dummy4   0.404  
   (1.461)  
Dummy5    0.375 
    (1.335) 
Controls Yes yes yes yes 
Industry×Year 
FE 
Yes yes yes yes 
County FE Yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.221 0.220 0.221 0.221 
Observations 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 
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Table 5 Baseline regressions on the effects of travel costs on tax avoidance 
This table reports baseline regressions on the effect of travel costs on tax avoidance. 
I define ETR and METR as the dependent variables. Distance_car measures the travel 
distance between firm and tax office by car. Distance_bike measures the distance 
between firm and tax office by bike. Duration_car measures the travel time between 
firm and tax office by car (min). Duration_bike measures the travel time between 
firm and tax office by bike (min). All of the independent variables are calculated as 
a natural logarithm. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. All of the 
regressions include year, industry, and industry year fixed effects. The p values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: The effect of travel costs by car 
 
Dependent 
variables 
ETR METR ETR METR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Distance car -0.464*** -0.609***   
 (-2.657) (-2.947)   
Duration car   -0.555** -0.727*** 
   (-2.455) (-2.697) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R squared 0.221 0.256 0.221 0.256 
Observations 16,124 14,827 16,124 14,827 
Panel B: The effect of travel costs by bike 
 
Dependent 
variables 
ETR METR ETR METR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Distance bike -0.422** -0.554***   
 (-2.504) (-2.764)   
Duration bike   -0.421** -0.553*** 
   (-2.502) (-2.765) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R squared 0.221 0.257 0.221 0.257 
Observations 16,047 14,755 16,047 14,755 
Panel C: The effect of travel costs by walk 
 
Dependent 
variables 
ETR METR ETR METR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Distance walk -0.368** -0.528***   
 (-2.247) (-2.710)   
Duration walk   -0.368** -0.528*** 
   (-2.249) (-2.711) 
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Controls Yes yes yes yes 
Industry×Year 
FE 
Yes yes yes yes 
County FE Yes yes yes yes 
Adj R squared 0.221 0.256 0.221 0.256 
Observations 16,124 14,827 16,124 14,827 
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Table 6 Community network effects on the relationship between geographic 
distance and tax avoidance 
This table provides the results of my baseline specification based on Model (2). I 
use the natural logarithm of the established age and listed age, SOE ownership, and 
local SOE ownership as my major information measures in period t to partition 
sample firms into those above and below the median, respectively, and using ETR 
variables as the dependent variables. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 
C. All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls, and year fixed 
effects (not reported for brevity). Standard errors are clustered at state-level and 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Using ETR as the dependent variable 
Dependent variable ETR 
Partition 
variable 
SOE Local SOE 
Established 
age 
Listed age 
Community 
age 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
SOE× Dista
nce(B2,1) 
-0.895**     
 (-1.985)     
Local 
SOE× Distanc
e(B2,2) 
-1.109**    
  (-2.071)    
Local SOE  2.426**    
  (2.332)    
High 
estage× Distan
ce(B2,3) 
 -1.174***   
   (-3.097)   
High 
estage 
  2.541***   
   (3.167)   
High 
listage× Dista
nce(B2,4) 
  -0.846**  
    (-2.260)  
High 
listage 
   1.963**  
    (2.563)  
High 
community 
age× Distance
(B2,5) 
   -0.796** 
     (-2.076) 
High 
community 
age 
    2.342*** 
     (2.995) 
Estage   1.798***   
   (4.055)   
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Community 
age 
    -0.070 
     (-0.271) 
Listage 1.665*** 1.645***  1.432***  
 (9.610) (9.441)  (7.682)  
Distance(B
1,i) 
-0.068 -0.151 0.187 0.010 0.011 
 (-0.249) (-0.625) (0.639) (0.039) (0.039) 
ROA -27.615** -27.096** -28.488** -27.571** -28.164** 
 (-2.129) (-2.091) (-2.183) (-2.133) (-2.214) 
SIZE -0.929*** -0.918*** -0.842*** -0.922*** -0.819*** 
 (-4.172) (-4.109) (-3.734) (-4.121) (-3.869) 
INTAN 8.083** 7.895** 7.599** 8.069** 6.639** 
 (2.555) (2.494) (2.397) (2.552) (2.154) 
PPE -7.573*** -7.672*** -6.284*** -7.447*** -4.161*** 
 (-6.505) (-6.610) (-5.506) (-6.399) (-3.826) 
Leverage 8.050*** 8.411*** 7.868*** 7.767*** 6.938*** 
 (3.517) (3.661) (3.405) (3.381) (3.170) 
FCF -13.969 -14.601 -16.644 -14.140 -8.435 
 (-1.082) (-1.132) (-1.282) (-1.098) (-0.673) 
NOL 1.457** 1.478** 1.683*** 1.450** 0.998* 
 (2.481) (2.522) (2.865) (2.470) (1.889) 
Capital 
Intensity 
1.415 1.453 0.702 1.375 0.141 
 (0.910) (0.936) (0.451) (0.883) (0.094) 
SD_ROA -11.151* -10.850* -5.938 -11.221* -2.586 
 (-1.917) (-1.873) (-1.042) (-1.936) (-0.473) 
Employee 0.463*** 0.468*** 0.570*** 0.465*** 0.577*** 
 (2.934) (2.962) (3.617) (2.951) (3.837) 
SOE 1.590* -0.259 0.664* 0.091 1.033*** 
 (1.828) (-0.564) (1.798) (0.236) (2.968) 
Industry×Y
ear FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.205 0.206 0.201 0.205 0.230 
Observatio
ns 
16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 13,596 
Test of joint significance 
 Coeff/F-stats 
B1,i+B2,i=
0 
6.14 3.56 2.13 3.6 3.08 
 0 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 
Panel B: Using METR as the dependent variable 
Dependent variable METR  
Partition 
variable 
SOE Local SOE 
Established 
age 
Listed age 
Community 
age 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  
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SOE× Dista
nce 
-0.705     
 (-1.517)     
Local 
SOE× Dista
nce 
 -1.186**    
  (-2.073)    
Local SOE  3.466***    
  (3.011)    
High 
estage× Dis
tance 
  -1.373***   
   (-3.530)   
High 
estage 
  3.670***   
   (4.352)   
High 
listage× Dis
tance 
   -1.005***  
    (-2.653)  
High 
listage 
   2.878***  
    (3.731)  
High 
community 
age× Distan
ce 
    -0.972** 
     (-2.159) 
High 
community 
age 
    3.258*** 
     (3.484) 
Estage   2.048***   
   (4.167)   
Community 
age 
    -0.111 
     (-0.331) 
Listage 1.960*** 2.175***  1.707***  
 (11.849) (11.599)  (8.418)  
Distance -0.256 -0.350 0.070 -0.126 -0.307 
 (-1.060) (-1.328) (0.239) (-0.458) (-0.931) 
ROA -14.862 -21.088 -24.008* -22.399 -29.069* 
 (-1.258) (-1.513) (-1.710) (-1.604) (-1.916) 
SIZE -0.413** -0.491** -0.379 -0.516** -0.537** 
 (-2.020) (-2.095) (-1.599) (-2.205) (-2.089) 
INTAN -2.564 -4.820 -5.126 -4.309 -3.734 
 (-0.928) (-1.427) (-1.500) (-1.280) (-0.965) 
PPE 2.633** 3.357** 5.383*** 3.866*** 6.260*** 
 (2.410) (2.523) (4.047) (2.872) (4.479) 
Leverage 4.665** 5.634** 4.524* 4.463* 5.641** 
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 (2.337) (2.347) (1.852) (1.856) (2.101) 
FCF -12.578 -14.624 -16.823 -13.267 -9.286 
 (-1.070) (-1.053) (-1.202) (-0.954) (-0.626) 
NOL -0.058 0.230 0.482 0.152 0.189 
 (-0.106) (0.338) (0.705) (0.224) (0.255) 
Capital 
Intensity 
-7.227*** -8.874*** -9.935*** -9.067*** -9.773*** 
 (-5.365) (-5.523) (-6.117) (-5.635) (-5.396) 
SD_ROA -2.474 -2.533 4.144 -3.240 2.915 
 (-0.469) (-0.408) (0.676) (-0.522) (0.451) 
Employee 0.024 0.030 0.164 0.015 0.241 
 (0.168) (0.179) (0.980) (0.087) (1.316) 
SOE 1.999** 0.074 1.661*** 0.926** 2.316*** 
 (2.285) (0.136) (3.936) (2.124) (5.205) 
Industry×Y
ear FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.291 0.258 0.251 0.257 0.253 
Observatio
ns 
14,827 14,827 14,827 14,827 12,556 
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Table 7 Community network effects on the relationship between geographic 
distance and tax avoidance 
This table provides the results of my baseline specification based on Model (2), using 
the Close variable as the independent variable. I code Close as 1 if the distance is 
below median, and 0 otherwise. I use the natural logarithm of the established age and 
listed age, SOE ownership, and local SOE ownership as my major information 
measures in period t to partition sample firms into those above and below the median, 
respectively, and use ETR variables as the dependent variables. Variable definitions 
can be found in Appendix C. All of the regressions include firm-level and county-
level controls, and year fixed effects (not reported for brevity). The p values reported 
in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable ETR  
Partition 
variable 
SOE Local SOE 
Established 
age 
Listed age 
Community 
age 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  
SOE× Close
(B2,1) 
-0.134*     
 (-1.862)     
Local 
SOE× Close
(B2,2) 
 -0.149**    
  (-2.326)    
Local SOE  1.450***    
  (2.627)    
High 
estage× Clo
se(B2,3) 
  -0.067**   
   (-2.295)   
High estage   0.950**   
   (2.420)   
High 
listage× Clo
se(B2,4) 
  1.574***   
   (4.045)   
High 
listage 
   -0.055*  
    (-1.817)  
High 
community 
age× Close(
B2,5) 
   0.808**  
    (2.215)  
High 
community 
age 
    0.603 
     (1.250) 
estage     0.640* 
     (1.793) 
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community 
age 
    -0.042 
     (-0.164) 
listage 1.369*** 1.512***  1.317***  
 (8.548) (9.969)  (8.145)  
Close 0.093 0.169 0.173 0.201 -0.103 
 (0.300) (0.590) (0.588) (0.694) (-0.276) 
SOE 0.702 -0.344 0.558* 0.020 1.058*** 
 (1.388) (-0.880) (1.755) (0.062) (3.031) 
Controls yes Yes yes yes yes 
Industry×Y
ear FE 
yes Yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes Yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.227 0.227 0.221 0.227 0.229 
Observatio
ns 
16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 13,596 
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Table 8 Sensitivity tests of the effects of geographic distance on tax avoidance 
This table provides further robustness checks of the specification in Panel A of Table 
10. Panel A reports the results for the distance effect on different tax avoidance 
measures. Panel B reports the results of the regressions, using the city-level 
macroeconomic variables as control variables. All of the regressions include firm-
level and county-level controls, and year fixed effects (not reported for brevity). The 
p values reported in parentheses are based on standard error clustered by firm. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Distance effect 
on different tax avoidance 
measures   
 Total ETR 
3-year 
adjusted 
ETR 
 
3-year 
forward 
ETR  
3-year 
lagged 
ETR 
 [1] [2]  [3]  [4] 
Distance -0.817** -2.350**  -0.783**  -0.724** 
 (-2.121) (-2.257)  (-2.324)  (-2.402) 
Controls yes yes  yes  yes 
Industry×
Year FE 
yes yes  yes 
 
yes 
County 
FE 
yes yes  yes 
 
yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.323 0.134  0.256 
 
0.286 
Observati
ons 
15,496 10,400  9,989 
 
12,138 
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables added as control variables 
 ETR METR ETR METR ETR METR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Distance 
-
0.557*** 
-0.610** -0.570** -0.573** 
-
0.666*** 
-0.518* 
 (-2.627) (-2.454) (-2.528) (-2.175) (-2.831) (-1.890) 
Populatio
n density 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
GDP no no yes yes yes yes 
Fiscal 
variables 
no no no no yes yes 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry×
Year FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
County 
FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.219 0.258 0.220 0.262 0.231 0.268 
Observati
ons 
14,193 13,064 12,138 11,145 10,373 9,530 
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Table 9 Accounting information effects on the relation between geographic 
distance and tax avoidance 
This table provides the results of my baseline specification based on different 
subsamples. I use the natural logarithm of the following reports and following 
analyst per year, absolute discretionary accruals, firm opaqueness, and auditing by 
Big 4 auditors as my major information measures in period t to partition sample 
firms into those above and below the median, respectively, and use ETR variables 
as the dependent variables. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. All of 
the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls, and year fixed effects 
(not reported for brevity). The p values reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Partition 
variable 
Big 4  
Analyst 
coverage by 
reports 
Analyst 
coverage by 
person 
Analyst 
forecast 
errors 
Dependent 
variable   
ETR ETR ETR ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
B4× Distance(
B2,1) 
1.296*    
 (1.681)    
B 4 -2.483*    
 (-1.837)    
High analyst 
cov1× Distanc
e (B2,2) 
 0.732**   
  (2.235)   
High analyst 
cov1 
 -1.972***   
  (-2.906)   
High analyst 
cov2× Distanc
e (B2,3) 
  0.540*  
   (1.676)  
High analyst 
cov2 
  -1.354**  
   (-2.013)  
High forecast 
error× Distanc
e (B2,4) 
   -0.531** 
    (-2.067) 
High forecast 
error 
   1.331** 
    (2.524) 
Distance(B1,i) -0.505** -0.825** -0.688** -0.065 
 (-2.128) (-2.560) (-2.170) (-0.251) 
Control yes yes yes yes 
Industry Year 
FE 
yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes 
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Adj. R 
squared 
0.199 0.198 0.202 0.257 
Observations 16,124 16,124 16,124 10,314 
Test of joint significance 
 Coeff/F-stats   
B1,i+B2,i=0 3.07 3.92 3.86 3.62 
 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
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Table 10 Univariate test for functional distance effect on the relation between 
geographic distance and tax avoidance 
This table shows the differences between the two sample means for ETR, and firm 
characteristics and the two-sample t-test results. Dark (bright) firm-years are defined 
as firm-years in which a firm’s location is lighter (darker) than that of the tax office. 
See Table 3.1 for the variable definitions and construction. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 N All firms Dark firms 
Bright 
firms Difference 
Panel A: Comparison of the mean ETR between treated and control firms 
ETR 8,288 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.02* 
Panel B: Comparison of the mean firm characteristics between dark and bright 
firms 
ROA 8,288 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.01 
SIZE 8,288 15.32 15.32 15.21 0.11 
INTAN 8,288 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02* 
PPE 8,288 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.02 
Leverage 8,288 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.04 
TobinsQ 8,288 2.57 2.57 2.54 0.03 
FCF 8,288 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
NOL 8,288 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.01 
CI 8,288 0.23 0.23 0.27 -0.04* 
Age 8,288 2.55 2.55 2.40 0.15** 
SOE 8,288 0.46 0.46 0.50 -0.04 
Employee 8,288 7.56 7.56 7.60 -0.04 
SD_ROA 8,288 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 
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Table 11 Baseline regressions on the functional effect of distance on corporate 
tax avoidance 
This table reports the regression results for the joint effects of geographic distance 
and functional distance on corporate tax avoidance, and tests for the coefficient 
differences between the effect of functional distance and geographic distance. The 
functional distance is measured by the dummy variable Bright, which equals 1 if the 
firm square is lighter than the tax office square, and 0 otherwise. Distance is the 
logarithm of the distance between the firm and tax office. Close is equal to 1 if the 
distance is below median, and 0 otherwise. The other control variables are the same 
set as in Table 3 in all regressions. In addition, I include dummy variable d1, which 
equals 1 if the firm square is lighter than 50, and 0 otherwise. All of the regressions 
include year, industry, and industry year fixed effects. The p values reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Using ETR as the dependent variable 
 ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Close× Brig
ht(A2,5) 
    0.103** 
     (2.477) 
Close(A1,i)  0.007*   0.007* 
  (1.796)   (1.735) 
Distance(A
1,i) 
  -0.017** -0.017**  
   (-2.038) (-2.018)  
Distance×
Bright(A2,4
) 
   -0.483***  
    (-3.214)  
Bright 0.064** 0.064** 0.068** 0.652*** 0.022 
 (2.307) (2.355) (2.455) (3.791) (0.585) 
d1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.515) (-0.152) (-0.533) (-0.665) (-0.658) 
ROA -0.465*** -0.470*** -0.468*** -0.472*** -0.467*** 
 (-2.751) (-2.783) (-2.772) (-2.790) (-2.764) 
SIZE -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-2.746) (-2.763) (-2.747) (-2.751) (-2.735) 
INTAN 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 
 (3.534) (3.528) (3.554) (3.564) (3.542) 
PPE -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 (-5.352) (-5.333) (-5.343) (-5.387) (-5.407) 
Leverage 0.057** 0.056* 0.056* 0.057** 0.058** 
 (1.965) (1.930) (1.922) (1.963) (2.017) 
FCF 0.045 0.051 0.049 0.054 0.048 
 (0.263) (0.301) (0.288) (0.316) (0.281) 
NOL 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
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 (2.753) (2.755) (2.749) (2.736) (2.740) 
Capital 
Intensity 
0.039* 0.040* 0.040* 0.040** 0.040** 
 (1.939) (1.942) (1.949) (1.994) (1.980) 
Age 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (8.617) (8.702) (8.618) (8.653) (8.664) 
SOE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.036) (0.008) (-0.007) (-0.099) (-0.136) 
SD_ROA -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.238*** 
 (-3.034) (-3.027) (-3.029) (-3.033) (-3.040) 
Employee 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.821) (0.806) (0.809) (0.845) (0.850) 
Industry 
Year FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 
Observatio
ns 
8,228 8,228 8,228 8,228 8,228 
Test of joint significance  Coeff/F-test 
A1+A3    2.28 5.3 
    -0.103 -0.005 
Panel B: Using METR as the dependent variable 
 METR METR METR METR METR 
 coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t 
Close× Brig
ht(A2,5) 
    0.046* 
     (1.725) 
Close(A1,i)  0.005   0.004 
  (1.046)   (0.991) 
Distance(A
1,i) 
  -0.016** -0.015*  
   (-1.991) (-1.935)  
Distance×
Bright(A2,4
) 
   -0.163*  
    (-1.953)  
Bright 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.213** -0.000 
 (0.524) (0.616) (0.779) (2.086) (-0.024) 
d1 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.601) (0.828) (0.591) (0.385) (0.395) 
ROA -0.482*** -0.484*** -0.484*** -0.485*** -0.486*** 
 (-2.707) (-2.717) (-2.722) (-2.724) (-2.729) 
SIZE -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.386) (-1.414) (-1.395) (-1.389) (-1.357) 
INTAN -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 
 (-0.662) (-0.642) (-0.647) (-0.633) (-0.663) 
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PPE 0.052*** 0.052** 0.052** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (2.582) (2.567) (2.575) (2.580) (2.604) 
Leverage 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 
 (0.974) (0.966) (0.951) (0.981) (0.996) 
FCF 0.089 0.091 0.092 0.094 0.092 
 (0.506) (0.519) (0.522) (0.533) (0.526) 
NOL 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.502) (0.502) (0.501) (0.485) (0.492) 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.097*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (-4.201) (-4.186) (-4.190) (-4.178) (-4.190) 
Age 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (9.875) (9.936) (9.876) (9.894) (9.845) 
SOE 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (1.389) (1.403) (1.401) (1.318) (1.328) 
SD_ROA -0.124 -0.125 -0.124 -0.125 -0.126 
 (-1.435) (-1.448) (-1.435) (-1.456) (-1.464) 
Employee -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.385) (-0.389) (-0.391) (-0.373) (-0.391) 
Industry 
Year FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
County FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 
0.271 0.271 0.272 0.272 0.271 
Observatio
ns 
7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 
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Table 12 Univariate test for shopping malls and difference-in-difference test 
This table shows the differences between the two sample means for ETR, and firm 
characteristics and the two-sample t-test results. Treated firm-years are defined as 
firm-years in which a firm was located in a district where a new shopping mall 
opened. See Table 3.1 for variable definitions and construction. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 N All firms  
Treated 
firms 
Control 
firms 
Difference 
Panel A: Comparison of the mean ETR between treated and control firms 
ETR 16,124 0.19 0.19 0.19 0 
Panel B: Comparison of the mean firm characteristics between treated and control 
firms 
ROA 16,124 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00** 
SIZE 16,124 15.58 15.5 15.61 -0.12* 
INTAN 16,124 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 
PPE 16,124 0.43 0.43 0.43 0 
Leverage 16,124 0.44 0.44 0.44 0 
TobinsQ 16,124 8.53 3.17 10.25 -7.09 
FCF 16,124 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
NOL 16,124 0.09 0.09 0.1 -0.01* 
CI 16,124 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.01*** 
Age 16,124 2.66 2.68 2.66 0.02*** 
SOE 16,124 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.01* 
Employee 16,124 7.56 7.47 7.59 -0.12*** 
SD_ROA 16,124 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00*** 
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Table 13 The effect of shopping malls on tax avoidance based on location 
relative to malls and firms 
This table provides the results of my tests of the effect of the opening of a new 
shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. ETR is the dependent variable. I divide 
the sample into different subgroups: firms located within 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 
km of the mall, and firms located at least 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, and 5 km away from 
the mall. I then re-run Model (3). All of the results are reported with year, county, 
and firm fixed effects. All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level 
controls, which are not reported for brevity. The p values reported in parentheses are 
based on standard error clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Using ETR as the dependent variable 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 2km  at least 2km within 3km  at least 3km 
Dependent variable ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 3.167*** -1.546*** 2.039** -1.811*** 
 (2.58) (-3.10) (2.15) (-3.41) 
ROA -21.796* -22.357** -20.180* -23.977** 
 (-1.76) (-1.99) (-1.65) (-2.11) 
SIZE -1.421*** -1.476*** -1.391*** -1.519*** 
 (-5.32) (-6.09) (-5.27) (-6.20) 
INTAN 1.012 -1.039 0.587 -1.329 
 (0.29) (-0.33) (0.17) (-0.41) 
PPE -3.390*** -4.093*** -3.291*** -3.888*** 
 (-2.75) (-3.65) (-2.70) (-3.43) 
Leverage 4.399* 7.869*** 5.074** 7.121*** 
 (1.88) (3.75) (2.21) (3.34) 
FCF -0.653 -1.020 -1.920 0.412 
 (-0.05) (-0.09) (-0.16) (0.04) 
NOL 1.051** 1.068*** 0.916** 1.215*** 
 (2.54) (2.82) (2.23) (3.18) 
Capital 
Intensity -0.774 0.946 -0.542 0.659 
 (-0.48) (0.64) (-0.35) (0.44) 
Age 0.516 0.418 0.477 0.439 
 (1.41) (1.28) (1.32) (1.33) 
SD_ROA 0.501** 0.514*** 0.517** 0.505*** 
 (2.43) (2.73) (2.53) (2.66) 
Employee -50.227 -50.967 -49.839 -12.715 
 (-1.49) (-1.53) (-1.48) (-0.38) 
SOE 0.729 0.285 0.576 0.275 
 (0.79) (0.34) (0.62) (0.33) 
Distance -0.798* -0.528 -0.932** -0.571 
 (-1.69) (-1.29) (-2.01) (-1.36) 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
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Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.467 0.468 0.466 0.470 
Observations 12,714 15,136 13,052 14,798 
Distance between malls and firms 
 within 4km  at least 4km within 5km  at least 5km 
Dependent variable ETR 
 [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mall 1.047 -1.790*** 0.737 -2.045*** 
 (1.31) (-3.16) (1.03) (-3.39) 
ROA -23.862** -21.567* -20.430* -23.425** 
 (-1.97) (-1.88) (-1.71) (-2.02) 
SIZE -1.426*** -1.499*** -1.422*** -1.495*** 
 (-5.47) (-6.01) (-5.53) (-5.95) 
INTAN 0.617 -1.219 0.207 -1.288 
 (0.18) (-0.37) (0.06) (-0.39) 
PPE -3.667*** -3.518*** -3.569*** -3.475*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.05) (-3.01) (-2.99) 
Leverage 4.978** 7.218*** 5.678** 6.725*** 
 (2.20) (3.33) (2.54) (3.07) 
FCF 0.460 -1.348 -2.152 -0.062 
 (0.04) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.01) 
NOL 0.876** 1.257*** 1.000** 1.141*** 
 (2.18) (3.23) (2.51) (2.90) 
Capital 
Intensity 0.166 -0.083 0.049 -0.141 
 (0.11) (-0.05) (0.03) (-0.09) 
Age 0.483 0.425 0.376 0.525 
 (1.36) (1.26) (1.07) (1.55) 
SD_ROA 0.505** 0.532*** 0.521*** 0.507*** 
 (2.50) (2.77) (2.61) (2.62) 
Employee -48.995 -52.169 -50.679 -50.900 
 (-1.46) (-1.56) (-1.50) (-1.53) 
SOE 0.684 0.180 0.772 -0.015 
 (0.76) (0.21) (0.86) (-0.02) 
Distance -0.878* -0.630 -0.795* -0.680 
 (-1.95) (-1.46) (-1.78) (-1.57) 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.470 0.466 0.466 0.470 
Observations 13,430 14,420 13,769 14,081 
Panel B: Using METR as the dependent variable 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 2km  at least 2km within 3km  at least 3km 
Dependent variable METR 
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 [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Mall 1.164 -1.177*** 0.810 -1.335*** 
 (1.22) (-2.96) (1.09) (-3.16) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.598 0.596 0.598 0.596 
Observations 11,662 13,907 11,972 13,597 
Distance between malls and firms 
 within 4km  at least 4km within 5km  at least 5km 
Dependent variable METR 
 [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mall 0.093 -1.324*** -0.358 -1.281*** 
 (0.15) (-2.94) (-0.64) (-2.65) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.597 0.598 0.596 0.599 
Observations 12,328 13,241 12,633 12,936 
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Table 14 Placebo test of pre-trend shock 
This table provides further robustness checks of Model (3) in Panel A of Table 10. 
All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls and year fixed 
effects, which are not reported for brevity. The table reports the results for the placebo 
test one, two, three years prior to the mall opening, when year k = -1, -2, -3. The p 
values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Depende
nt 
variable ETR METR ETR METR ETR METR 
 k=-1 k=-2 k=-3 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mall -0.224 -0.006 0.257 -0.004 0.181 -0.002 
 (-0.50) (-1.40) (0.56) (-0.84) (0.37) (-0.35) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.469 0.554 0.470 0.557 0.472 0.556 
Observati
ons 15,691 14,421 15,751 14,482 15,810 14,539 
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Table 15 Falsification tests of the effect of new office buildings  
This table details the results of a falsification test of the effect of new office 
buildings.  
Dependent variable ETR METR 
 [1] [2] 
Office -0.377 0.331 
 (-0.87) (0.76) 
ROA -18.729* -31.450** 
 (-1.68) (-2.57) 
SIZE -1.681*** -0.578** 
 (-6.92) (-2.31) 
INTAN 0.415 2.510 
 (0.13) (0.77) 
PPE -4.074*** 0.705 
 (-3.64) (0.60) 
Leverage 7.416*** 2.376 
 (3.56) (1.08) 
FCF -1.811 -12.116 
 (-0.17) (-1.01) 
NOL 1.353*** -0.008 
 (3.59) (-0.02) 
Capital Intensity 0.380 -1.630 
 (0.26) (-1.08) 
Age 0.269 -0.285 
 (0.83) (-0.88) 
Employee 0.539*** 0.177 
 (2.84) (0.87) 
SD_ROA -57.148* 9.890 
 (-1.69) (0.31) 
SOE 0.982 -0.620 
 (1.16) (-0.67) 
Distance -0.016 -0.072 
 (-0.35) (-1.53) 
Year FE yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes 
R-squared 0.473 0.555 
Observations 15,426 14,189 
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Table 16 The effects of parking spaces on the relationship between shopping 
malls and tax avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests of the effect of the opening 
of a new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. DiD tests are estimated on 
median partitioned subsamples, using ETR as the dependent variable. Samples are 
partitioned based on whether the number of mall parking spaces is above or below 
the median. All of the results are reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. 
All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls, which are not 
reported for brevity. The p values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A：Using ETR as the dependent variable 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 3 km at least 3 km 
Parking lot Low High Low High 
Dependent variable ETR  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall -2.108 -3.657** 1.071 3.027*** 
 (-1.43) (-2.16) (0.87) (2.68) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.602 0.587 0.463 0.468 
Observations 4,328 3,824 12,745 12,757 
Panel B：Using METR as the dependent variable 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 3 km at least 3 km 
Parking lot Low High Low High 
Dependent variable METR  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall -2.046 1.462* 0.414 -1.863*** 
 (-1.53) (1.68) (0.42) (-3.44) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.701 0.599 0.595 0.600 
Observations 3,454 11,717 11,670 12,605 
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Table 17 The effect of geographic distance on the relationship between 
shopping malls and tax avoidance 
This table provides regression results that test the effect of geographic distance on 
the relationship between shopping malls and tax avoidance. 
Distance between mall and 
firm 
within 3 km at least 3 km 
 
Small 
distance 
Large distance 
Small 
distance 
Large distance 
Dependent variable 
                
ETR 
 
                
ETR 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 0.908 4.073** -1.414 -2.412*** 
 (0.75) (2.53) (-1.53) (-3.60) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R squared 0.475 0.481 0.485 0.479 
Observations 6,746 6,306 7,282 7,516 
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Table 18 The effects on the relationship between shopping malls and tax 
avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests on the effect of the opening 
of a new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. DiD tests are estimated on 
median partitioned subsamples, using ETR as the dependent variable. The samples 
are partitioned based on whether firms are local SOEs or not. I split the sample in a 
similar fashion across all the panels, as in the previous tables. All of the results are 
reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. All of the regressions include firm-
level and county-level controls, which are not reported for brevity. The p values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 3km at least 3km 
 non-SOE SOE non- SOE SOE 
Dependent variable ETR  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 1.631 1.458 -1.908*** -2.826** 
 (1.28) (0.96) (-3.14) (-2.48) 
Controls Yes yes Yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes Yes yes 
Firm FE Yes yes Yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.454 0.508 0.468 0.500 
Observations 9,723 3,329 11,164 3,634 
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Table 19 The effects on the relationship between shopping malls and tax 
avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests on the effect of the opening 
of a new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. DiD tests are estimated on 
median partitioned subsamples, using ETR as the dependent variable. The samples 
are partitioned based on whether firms are local SOEs or not. I split the sample in a 
similar fashion across all the panels, as in the previous tables. All of the results are 
reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. All of the regressions include firm-
level and county-level controls, which are not reported for brevity. The p values 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 within 3km at least 3km 
 Low age High age Low age High age 
Dependent 
variable ETR ETR ETR ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 2.675** 2.104 -1.016 -2.175** 
 (1.99) (1.40) (-1.54) (-2.37) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.540 0.444 0.532 0.455 
Observations 6,989 6,063 8,000 6,798 
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Table 20 The effects on the relationship between shopping malls and tax avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests on the effect of the opening of a 
new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. DiD tests are estimated on median 
partitioned subsamples, using ETR as the dependent variable. Samples are partitioned 
based on whether the county level population density is above or below the median. All of 
the results are reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. All of the regressions 
include firm-level and county-level controls, which are not reported for brevity. The p 
values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 3km at least 3 km  
Population 
density    
Low High Low High 
Dependent variable ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 2.155 2.344 -1.017 -4.011*** 
 (1.52) (1.54) (-1.43) (-3.48) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R squared 0.473 0.484 0.466 0.502 
Observations 5,271 6,184 6,504 6,506 
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Table 21 The effects on the relationship between shopping malls and tax 
avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests on the effect of the opening 
of a new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. DiD tests are estimated on 
median partitioned subsamples, using ETR as the dependent variable. Samples are 
partitioned based on whether the firm area nighttime illumination is above or below 
the median. All of the results are reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. 
All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls, which are not 
reported for brevity. The p values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Distance between mall and firm 
 within 3 km at least 3 km 
     
Nighttime 
illumination 
Low High Low High 
Dependent variable ETR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mall 1.874 -5.207** -2.108 -3.657** 
 (0.42) (-2.49) (-1.43) (-2.16) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R 
squared 0.599 0.565 0.602 0.587 
Observations 3,652 3,576 4,328 3,824 
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Table 22 The effect of firm location on the relationship between shopping 
malls and tax avoidance 
This table provides the cross-sectional results of my tests of the effect of the opening 
of a new shopping mall on corporate tax avoidance. I define a large angle from the 
mall to the tax office as larger than 90 degrees, and a small angle as less than 90 
degrees. Panel A provides the results based on samples of firms in the large angle 
group and the small angle group. DiD tests are estimated on partitioned subsamples, 
using ETR as the dependent variable. Panel B provides placebo tests for the large 
angle group. All of the results are reported with year, county, and firm fixed effects. 
All of the regressions include firm-level and county-level controls, which are not 
reported for brevity. The p values reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression 
results 
  
 Small angle sample   Large angle sample 
Dependent 
variables 
ETR ETR  
 [1] [3]  
Mall -0.609 -2.270**  
 (-1.14) (-2.11)  
Controls yes yes  
Year FE yes yes  
Firm FE yes yes  
Adj. R squared 0.466 0.469  
Observations 14,965 12,773  
Panel B: Placebo tests               Large angle sample 
Dependent 
variables 
ETR ETR ETR 
 k=-1 k=-2 k=-3 
 [1] [3] [5] 
Mall -0.735 -0.145 -0.500 
 (-0.69) (-0.13) (-0.38) 
Controls yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes 
Adj. R squared 0.469 0.468 0.469 
Observations 12,782 12,794 12,807 
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Figure 1. Map of Chaoyang county, Beijing, and locations of Chaoyang tax 
office and firms 
On the first map, the tax office is marked in teardrop-shaped, and firms are circles. 
On the second map, the administrative area of Chaoyang County is bounded by red 
lines.  
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